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ABSTRACT 
 This topic has been directly requested for research by Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) San Diego. The Navy and other 
Department of Defense (DOD) entities use a contracting vehicle called the Spiral 3 
Multiple Award Contract (MAC) that provides cellular and other handheld wireless 
services to Navy commands within all 50 states. Broadly, the Spiral 3 contract is set up 
with three participating vendors: AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile. For any given Navy 
command, they each submit to their local NAVSUP FLC contracting officer a list of their 
cellular and wireless requirements. These requirements are then solicited to the Spiral 3 
vendors. A task order against the Spiral 3 contract is then awarded to the vendor that 
came in with the lowest-priced, technically acceptable offer. This contract model has 
consistently been able to keep domestic cellular costs down from older contract vehicles. 
However, costs have remained high for international services, with frequent cost overruns 
occurring due to overages in international service by various Navy commands. Our 
research found that high international costs were due to a combination of suboptimal 
contract language and not fully utilizing vendor competition. Better defined contractual 
language and better utilizing existing vendor competition should lower international 
wireless costs. 
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Like the U.S. commercial market itself, the federal government relies on the four 
major U.S. wireless vendors to fulfill wireless requirements: Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and 
T-Mobile. Historically, the federal government has used myriad different government 
contracting vehicles to procure wireless services, with agencies often procuring these 
services either on their behalf with their contracting authority or through an intermediary, 
such as the General Services Administration. The Department of the Navy (DON) is on the 
third iteration of their wireless contract, the Spiral 3 contract. This contract has used 
competition among all the major U.S. wireless vendors and prepriced exhibit line items 
(ELIN) to provide competitive wireless pricing to DON customers on domestic services.  
However, according to the Spiral 3 contract manager at Naval Supply Systems 
Command Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC SD), the cost savings seen in 
the domestic sphere have not been seen in the international services provided under the 
Spiral 3 contract. Consequently, the NAVSUP FLC SD requested that we look into how 
NAVSUP might be able to obtain cost savings on the international requirements for DON 
customers. By determining the current gaps in acquiring international services and 
exploring why it is currently costly to acquire them, we show how the DON can acquire 
international services at a lower cost than it does currently.  
Unlike the structure for domestic services, which has all Exhibit Line Items (ELIN) 
with set prices during the time of solicitation, all international services for DON customers 
are solicited for competitive pricing from all Spiral 3 vendors during the solicitation of that 
customer’s requirements. To come up with a quote for international services, all Spiral 3 
vendors were given anticipated usage for minutes and texts within each country that a DON 
customer was expected to travel within that year. Additionally, the structure allowed for 
unlimited international email usage, with a price ceiling in the contract at $16/month per 
line. This aligns with the standard commercial framework in which the largest U.S. 
wireless service providers have provided service to their customers when traveling abroad. 
Due to their agreements with wireless providers overseas, U.S. wireless providers tend to 
xvi 
charge their customers rates that are dependent on where they are traveling, with some 
countries having much cheaper rates than others.  
Even though the structure of the Spiral 3 contract is that international service quotes 
are based on competition at the time of solicitation, the actual market for international rates 
under the Spiral 3 umbrella is extremely noncompetitive. Notably, the two vendors with 
the largest number of task orders under the Spiral 3 contract, Verizon and AT&T, have the 
most costly rate structures for their clients. In the course of examining market research 
provided by NAVSUP FLC SD with the main Spiral 3 vendors, we discovered that both 
AT&T’s and Verizon’s rate structures consisted of higher costs per minute and more texts 
taken on average across all countries than Sprint or T-Mobile, in addition to charging their 
customers $16/month per line for unlimited international data. Conversely, T-Mobile and 
Sprint both offered lower international rates than their competitors. Both offered unlimited 
international texts, flat voice rates of $0.20/min (T-Mobile) or $0.25/min (Sprint) for calls 
made in most countries, and unlimited international services included in the domestic 
ELINs under the Spiral 3 contract, which essentially made international data a free service 
provided by both vendors if services were acquired under one of their domestic ELINs.  
Furthermore, our analysis looked at the surrounding market for wireless services to 
see whether there were any potential competitors outside the current Spiral 3 vendors. Even 
though the U.S. wireless market is dominated by these four vendors, mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNO) that use existing infrastructure from other wireless vendors to sell 
services to customers have been entering the market and providing customers with more 
competitive options. Notably, we examine the MVNO Google Fi and found that Google 
Fi’s commercial rates for international services are more competitive than Verizon’s and 
AT&T’s government rates for international services under the Spiral 3 contract. Google 
Fi’s model is similar to T-Mobile’s and Sprint’s with $0.20/voice minute and unlimited 
texting and data.  
To do an accurate business comparison, we attempted to get bills and invoices from 
the vendors in order to analyze their charges and determine how much an actual DON 
command would have been charged by each vendor. However, given the COVID-19 
pandemic, the data were not obtainable. Instead, the authors constructed a variety of 
xvii 
hypothetical usage scenarios for DON commands operating overseas based on the 
aggregate data that was available, with these scenarios varying in degree of command size, 
international phone usage, and so on. Based on these scenarios, we concluded that if all 
Verizon and AT&T accounts that used international service switched to Sprint, T-Mobile, 
or Google Fi, the government would experience the following cost savings: 
• Total Savings Verizon to Google: $1,019,397.76 
• Total Savings Verizon to T-Mobile: $1,016, 878.72 
• Total Savings Verizon to Sprint: $983,501.44 
• Total Savings AT&T to Google: $4,129,034.40 
• Total Savings AT&T to T-Mobile: $4,124,656.80 
• Total Savings AT&T to Sprint: $4,066.653.60 
While these cost savings were based on improvised scenarios rather than actual data 
usage, our analysis highlights how much more costly the top two Spiral 3 providers are 
compared to their counterparts for international services.  
Consequently, our recommendations to NAVSUP FLC SD are as follows. First, 
standardize all international rates into the next iteration of the Spiral contract rather than 
soliciting pricing from vendors at the time of solicitation. Second, bring more competition 
into the next Spiral contract. As can be seen from our analysis, a competitive MVNO such 
as Google Fi already offers better pricing for international services than the current 
providers on the Spiral contract. With the purchasing power available to the DON, these 
rates could get even lower if new vendors were added. Finally, the DON should ensure that 
end users better define their international requirements so that vendors with a more 
competitive international services rate structure have a better chance of winning those 
contracts. This would also ensure that end users do not become anti-deficient when they 
understate their international requirements and then go over their allotted dollar thresholds 
of services within their task orders. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the technology for wireless cellular devices has made the use of smartphones 
ubiquitous in daily life for most U.S. citizens, it has also become a necessity for the daily 
operational needs of the U.S. military. Wireless cellular devices are often provided to a 
command’s most essential personnel for official work functions, such as business calls and 
emails. Increasingly, personnel deploying or traveling need their command wireless 
devices as a “tether” back to their home unit or command for support, questions, and so on. 
To meet this increased demand for wireless cellular devices, many federal agencies—
including the General Services Administration (GSA), Army, Air Force, and Navy—have 
all offered their own contract models for wireless services and their corresponding devices 
(Thompson, 2018). These contract models have been put in place within the last decade. 
At the same time, the contract models have been administered under a background of 
continual reform within federal contracting. Such reforms have included consolidating 
identical requirements to reduce the number of contracts written, bundling requirements to 
more effectively take advantage of the government’s massive purchasing power, and 
leveraging commercial industry to maximize competition and lower prices among 
participating vendors. 
The Department of the Navy’s (DON) first modern wireless contract was the Spiral 
contract, with its first iteration, Spiral 1, being awarded in 2011. It is now on its third 
iteration, Spiral 3, and continues to be streamlined through each successive iteration to 
provide maximum operational support to the warfighter at the lowest possible costs. With 
Sprint joining the Spiral 3 contract near the end of 2019, all major U.S. cellular providers 
(i.e., AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile) are now participating vendors. While 
unlimited data, voice, and texting plans are available under the Spiral 3 contract for 
domestic service, this is currently not an option for some of the international services 
provided by major vendors. Competition in the U.S. wireless telecommunication industry 
has been artificially limited by corporate lobbying and has declined largely due to policy 
influenced strongly by lobbyists’ efforts and campaign finance contributions. Where pro-
competition policies should have led to increased cost savings for the American consumer 
2 
without a decrease in service quality, this has not been the case in the wireless 
telecommunication industry (Philippon, 2019). Additionally, the contract managers still 
believe that even though competition and contract reforms have helped lower prices on 
domestic plans, international services under the Spiral 3 should have lower prices than they 
do currently (Ott, 2019). Consequently, we research the current international data services 
offered under the Spiral 3 contract and why the prices for international services are 
perceived to be much higher than they should be by the DON personnel who oversee the 
Spiral 3 contract. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question we intend to answer is 
1. How can the Navy better acquire international cellular and wireless 
services than it does currently? 
Secondary and related research questions that help answer our primary research 
question include 
2. What are the gaps in international service currently, and how can the Navy 
fill them?  
3. Why is it so costly for the Navy to acquire international cellular and 
wireless service? 
B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
To answer these research questions, we provide a thorough background in the U.S. 
telecommunication industry both domestically and internationally. This includes concepts 
such as the regulatory environment both in the United States and abroad. By analyzing 
international data rates under the Spiral 3 contract, we attempt to leverage innovation in 
both technology and the commercial world to determine a solution for the DON that might 
result in lower prices for international services than what are provided currently. The 
following list describes the contents of the ensuing chapters: 
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• Chapter II: A background on DON wireless contracts and a review of the 
commercial mobile telecommunication industry as a basis for comparing 
the level of competition in the mobile telecommunication industry and how 
the different players operate in the United States and globally. 
• Chapter III: A literature review on federal contracting and the economics 
of the mobile telecommunication industry and the role of government 
regulations and market competition. 
• Chapter IV: A presentation of the data collected, of the trends identified 
from the Spiral 3 contract, and of the international roaming fee structures of 
the providers within the contract. 
• Chapter V: An analysis of the data collected and of the usage patterns that 
were identified to build a model using the international data rates identified. 
The model used identifies a clear heuristic view on which providers offer 
the best value to the Navy for international wireless services.  
• Chapter VI: A summary of findings from our analysis and findings on 
international service gaps and the high cost of international wireless 
services. Additionally, a recommendation to improve future DOD contracts 
for wireless services is included, as well as recommendations for areas that 
may be beneficial for future studies. 
Additionally, appendices are included to elaborate on our data for our basis of 
modeling and the detailed tables on modeling results. 
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Chapter II provides relevant background covering the history of DON wireless 
contracts. It also includes an overview of the mobile telecommunication ecosystem and a 
description of the role of mobile network operators (MNO) and mobile virtual networks 
operators (MVNO), the process of international roaming, and the future of mobile 
telecommunication with the fifth-generation (5G) network.  
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WIRELESS CONTRACTS 
Since 2009, the DON has been looking for avenues to “improve the acquisition and 
management of wireless services” (Thompson, 2015, p. 1), so they established a wireless 
commodity team to look into exploring improvement avenues (Thompson, 2015). The big 
deficiencies in the DON’s acquisition of wireless orders included (a) no competition per 
issuance of each task order on a contract, (b) the large number of contract line item numbers 
(CLINs) associated with each task order, (c) plans not aligned with current commercial 
offerings, (d) lack of additional features available for many of the plans, and (e) no 
visibility across the DON on wireless usage rates (Thompson, 2015). These all led to 
detrimental effects for the DON’s wireless acquisition structure. First, with no competition 
on task orders, the DON could not take advantage of the competition between U.S. wireless 
providers. Once a contract was written, those prices would be locked in against all 
subsequent task orders against that contract. Second, the sheer number of CLINs on each 
task order needlessly increased the administrative time it took to write each task order. 
Third, given that the Navy locked in plans when they wrote contracts, they were often 
unable to later take advantage of new commercial plans that might offer either new 
technology or similar services being provided but at lower costs. Fourth, lack of feature 
availability only hindered the customer—the warfighter—by not giving them the 
opportunity to outfit themselves with the most innovative commercial wireless technology 
available, especially when they were operating outside the continental United States 
(OCONUS). Finally, without usage rate data, the DON was unable to get a good grasp on 
their spend rate and usage rate on commercial wireless services. 
6 
In order to correct these deficiencies, the DON developed a plan that would 
maximize competition, simplify the contract structure of a task order to have one CLIN per 
task order, only put on contracts for orders that were being used by DON commands, look 
to optimize rate plan pools, improve wireless packaging with newer features, and define 
wireless metrics that would allow the DON to gain transparency on wireless spend and 
usage rates (Thompson, 2015). As a result of this corrective action plan, the DON 
developed a multiple award contract (MAC) vehicle for wireless services called the Spiral 
1 contract in early 2011. This contract was spearheaded by a naval regional contracting 
office, Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC 
SD), and included potential contract awards to all four major wireless providers, which are 
AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile (Thompson, 2011). This contract met corrective 
actions by  
• offering only plans that had historical DON usage;  
• ensuring that all plans were competitively priced; 
• standardizing rates among all eligible competitors to maximize 
competition between them, leading to lower pricing; 
• taking advantage of innovation and changes within the marketplace;  
• providing the DON with real-time wireless usage rates and spending; 
and  
• allowing for the ability to optimize rate plans by sharing and pooling 
data and minutes. (Thompson, 2015, p 3)  
In 2012, NAVSUP FLC SD introduced a successor to their Spiral 1 contract, the 
Spiral 2 contract, which further capitalized on the features that originated in the Spiral 1 
contract. As a result of the implementation of the Spiral 1 and 2 contracts, between Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2012 and FY2014, the DOD eliminated 14,414 excess phone lines, reduced 
average cost per wireless device by $5.45, reduced OCONUS roaming costs by 55%, and 
increased the minute utilization rate by 150% (Thompson, 2015). Additionally, since the 
start of FY2011 through FY2014, NAVSUP FLC SD estimates that they have saved the 
government $51.9 million through the utilization of these contract vehicles (Thompson, 
2015). 
Around the time that NAVSUP FLC SD rolled out the Spiral 1 contract, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) voiced criticism, government-wide, of the 
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inefficiencies in MAC award trends that would have large ramifications on the Spiral 
contract going forward. In their report to Congress titled Opportunities to Reduce Potential 
Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Competition, the 
GAO highlighted two major issues with MAC contracts as used at the time in government 
(Dalton & St. Laurent, 2011). The first issue was that there was no government-wide, 
comprehensive view of outstanding contracts that government agencies could use to 
determine whether there were open contracts that could meet their needs, which itself posed 
two problems. First, if agencies recompeted similar requirements that could have been 
covered under one contract but instead covered different contracts and possibly different 
vendors, the government loses an opportunity to leverage its large buying power to lower 
prices (Dalton & St. Laurent, 2011). When the government can consolidate its 
requirements, businesses might be more apt to lower their prices to get a large sale. Second, 
when a redundant contract is written, that is just an unnecessary burden on an agency’s 
contracting department, essentially resulting in duplicate work for a requirement that could 
have been fulfilled elsewhere. 
Besides the government being unable to leverage its buying power, the use of 
excess or redundant contracts actually leads overall contract cost to come in higher than it 
would have had contracts been efficiently utilized across agencies. Many of these costs 
could end up being very significant. Vendors accrue administrative costs in preparing bids 
for government contracts, which are then passed to the government if the vendor wins the 
award. Based on feedback from vendors, the GAO estimated that additional costs in 
redundant contracts ranged from $10,000 to $1 million (Dalton & St. Laurent, 2011). Had 
agencies utilized existing contracts, these excess vendor costs would have disappeared.  
Even though the GAO recommendations are nonbinding, federal agencies typically 
take them very seriously and do what they can to comply with them. In September 2011, 
Daniel Gordon, administrator of federal procurement policy in the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), released a memorandum highlighting the corrective action that federal 
agencies would need to take as a result of the GAO’s recommendations. Moving forward, 
all federal agencies were required to do a business case analysis on all new or renewal of 
existing “GWACs [Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts], MACs, Blanket Purchase 
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Agreements (BPAs), and agency specific contracts” (Gordon, 2011, p. 1). The intent with 
this requirement was to force agencies during their procurement research to determine 
whether existing contracts could cover their new requirement. If contracts do exist, and if 
it is financially feasible to do so, federal agencies need to use those contract vehicles or 
justify why they are not using them. The requirement to determine adequate use of existing 
contracts might also be seen as an explicit extension of Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) Part 10 on market research, which mandates that a federal agency must determine 
whether sources exist to satisfy their requirement. In the course of market research, other 
agency contracts could be found, which would show that a vendor could satisfy this 
requirement as they already had a contract with another agency for it. However, since there 
was no explicit requirement to explore using these existing contracts, agencies were free 
to execute their own contracts. 
In 2015, when NAVSUP FLC SD started to get ready to transition to the next 
iteration of their wireless contract, Spiral 3, they were required to do a business case 
analysis (BCA) as a result of the aforementioned OMB mandate (Gordon, 2011). When 
they completed their BCA, NAVSUP FLC SD found that two other wireless contracts 
could be utilized. There were the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) wireless 
Basic Purchase Agreements administered by the General Services Administration (GSA) 
and the Army/Air Force next-generation wireless contracts, administered by those service 
branches. After conducting research into their respective contract structures, NAVSUP 
FLC SD determined that these contracts were not as cost-efficient as the Navy’s current 
Spiral contract, as the features that made the contracts so cost-efficient were not present in 
either the GSA’s or the Army/Air Force’s existing wireless contracts (Thompson, 2015). 
Consequently, the DON determined that based on this BCA, the most financially prudent 
decision to make would be to continue on with their next iteration in the series, Spiral 3.  
In 2017, the Navy awarded its follow-on Spiral 3 contract to three vendors: T-
Mobile, Verizon, and AT&T (Hill, 2017). In doing so, the Navy continued to capitalize on 
the efficiencies that were initiated by Spiral 1 and Spiral 2 contract vehicles and used the 
previous contracts efficiencies to provide great value for DON customers. 
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As seen in Figure 1, the Navy’s Spiral 3 contract offered better prices to customers 
than almost every other federal wireless vehicle for participating vendors. Additionally, the 
Navy’s contract was the only one of all the contracts compared that offered completely 
unlimited data and minutes. While all the other government contracts advertised unlimited 
data, none of them advertised unlimited minutes. Even in those few cases where another 
government contract, such as GSA Schedule 70, could provide a cheaper price with a 
vendor, they did not offer as robust a service as the Navy’s contract. So even where it might 
be more expensive, a customer choosing between the two might determine they were better 
off paying more when the trade-off was better operational capability. 
 
Figure 1. Federal Wireless Contract Price Comparison. Adapted from 
Thompson (2018). 
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As the DON showed with each iteration of their Spiral contract model, they 
continued to achieve efficiencies and cost savings on wireless services agency-wide while 
still ensuring they could support the warfighter’s requirements. Meanwhile, the OMB 
focused their earlier efforts on reducing federal contract duplication onto federal wireless 
contracts, which would ultimately lead to the Spiral 3 contract being adopted DOD-wide 
for all wireless CONUS services. In 2016, Anne Rung, the OMB’s chief acquisition officer, 
and Tony Scott, the OMB’s chief information officer, released a joint memorandum further 
addressing the need for remedies of excessive duplication of wireless contracts across the 
government. They noted that there are over 1,200 separate contracts for awards, and almost 
all went to the four main U.S. wireless providers (Rung & Scott, 2016). The OMB’s 
guidance to government agencies in this memorandum was to reduce the number of 
existing contracts for wireless service and, if possible, transition to a government-wide 
contract (Rung & Scott, 2016). 
Consequently, the DOD attempted to enact this OMB guidance within its own 
agency. In 2018, DOD Chief Management Officer John Gibson released an official 
memorandum stating that, in accordance with Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’s guidance 
to streamline requirements and acquisition processes, all DOD agencies would be directed 
to procure all unclassified, wireless services in the continental United States (CONUS) 
through the DON Spiral 3 contract, which—between its base year and 4 additional option 
years—is expected to run from 2017 through 2022 (Gibson, 2018). In order to potentially 
cover this increased demand, the entire contract ceiling of the Spiral 3 contract was $993.5 
million (Thompson, 2018). The DOD made this decision after a stringent review of all 
DOD wireless contracts, finding that, overall, the DON Spiral 3 contract provides the “best 
value” to the customer across the spectrum of DOD wireless contracts (Gibson, 2018). 
B. COMMERCIAL MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY 
Since 1837, when Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, the way people 
communicate with one another across great distances has been rapidly advancing and 
changing. In just under 40 years, Alexander Graham Bell would invent the telephone, and 
in fewer than 100 years after that, Motorola would invent the very first mobile phone. 
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Mobile telecommunication services are a necessary aspect of daily life. The mobile 
telecommunication ecosystem is made up of a global industry including several layers and 
markets that work together to provide services to the consumer. The layers in this industry 
can be broken down into hardware and service providers on the highest level and can be 
further segmented into the types of service providers. However, the forces at work within 
industries across different areas are quite different for many reasons, including federal 
regulations and customer preferences (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011). 
1. The Mobile Telecommunication Industry 
The mobile market has many different parts, including end users, services 
providers, and hardware/software distributors. In the arena of telecommunication, there are 
many types of operators. Some of these could be considered fixed operators and some 
mobile. For this study, we focus on the mobile sector. Businesses have started to 
increasingly offer fixed and mobile services simultaneously, leveraging agreements with 
other businesses. Even though the market is dominated by a small number of providers, it 
also includes smaller regional service providers (Wakefield et al., 2007).  
A divided but synergistic industry provides voice and data to meet growing 
demand. The major entities consist of those who operate the telecommunication 
infrastructure, those who deliver hardware to customers, and those who create content that 
customers get with their mobile devices (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011). MNOs are companies or 
organizations that are licensed to operate and have the necessary hardware to provide radio 
coverage and telephone services. MNOs own, run, and sustain all the telecommunication 
equipment themselves or hire contractors to run and sustain the equipment on their behalf. 
The MNO must have a license to operate a specific part of the radio spectrum and must set 
up the infrastructure required (e.g., acquiring sites, building radio stations, etc.) to provide 
capacity on those parts of the radio spectrum on which it has a license to operate (Balon & 
Liau, 2012). Governments typically keep a close hold on the number of MNOs through 
regulation and control of the mobile spectrum, mostly to ensure that monopolies are not 
created. 
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The end user is not strictly limited to MNOs in their pursuit of mobile services. 
There is a whole market of service providers that do not own or operate a mobile 
infrastructure—such as Google Fi, MetTel, and Boost Mobile—which are labeled as 
mobile virtual network operators (MVNO). An MVNO will brand all hardware and 
services provided as its own, but in reality they have set up an agreement with an MNO 
that sells the MVNO both the hardware and wireless capacity necessary to provide to their 
customers (Wakefield et al., 2007). There are several definitions of an MVNO and 
explanations of how they differ from other mobile service providers, which are explored 
further in other sections of this study. Depending on the size and customer base of an 
MVNO, they may utilize the services of a mobile virtual network enabler (MVNE). 
The third leg of the mobile telecommunication industry triumvirate is an MVNE, 
which provides network infrastructure and other ancillary services to an MVNO. The 
services that MVNEs provide allow MVNOs to offer mobile telecommunication service to 
their customers with their brands without having the administrative overhead that a typical 
MNO requires. Different from an MNO or MVNO, an MVNE does not provide services 
directly to the consumers but is a provider to the providers, giving the MVNO the capability 
required for them to provide services to the customer (Wakefield et al., 2007). Related to 
an MVNE is a mobile virtual network aggregator (MVNA). While an MVNE provides 
required hardware/software capability to an MVNO, an MVNA is better understood as a 
business model (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011).  
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Figure 2 highlights how all three legs of the of the triumvirate interact with each 
other. 
 
Figure 2. Mobile Virtual Network Enabler. Source: Wakefield et al. (2007). 
Over the past two decades, the mobile telecommunication infrastructure has been 
growing globally, allowing access to mobile services across the majority of the populated 
areas in the world. In 2019, over five billion people had some type of mobile service 
(GSMA, 2019). The mobile telecommunication industry accounted for 4.7% of gross 
domestic product worldwide, a value of approximately $4.1 trillion (GSMA, 2019). 
Additionally, the industry employs 30 million people and provides tax revenue of $490 
billion (Hatt & Robinson, 2020). According to Bogdan-Martin (2020), 97% of the global 
population lives in proximity of a cellular signal, and 82% have access to a fourth-
generation (4G) or higher broadband. Figure 3 highlights the increasing growth of mobile 
subscriptions globally, while Figure 4 shows the ever-increasing availability for the global 
population to obtain higher mobile-broadband services. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of Mobile and Fixed Trends, 2005–2019. Source: 
Bogdan-Martin (2020). 
 
Figure 4. Mobile Population Coverage. Source: Bogdan-Martin (2020). 
2. Mobile Network Operators  
A mobile network operator (MNO) provides wireless voice and data services for 
the end user. An MNO owns the complete telecommunication infrastructure that it operates 
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(Wakefield et al., 2007). MNOs also own and operate the infrastructure required to enable 
the services they provide. The basic infrastructure includes many base stations that provide 
network access to mobile subscribers (Cricelli et al., 2011). Besides providing voice 
capabilities, MNOs also provide data services in the forms of texting and internet. In the 
traditional business model for mobile telecommunication, the MNO provides all of these 
capabilities, but a growing player in the mobile telecommunication space is the MVNO 
provider.  
An MNO receives a license from the U.S. government to utilize a specific 
frequency band in a specific area, commonly referred to as spectrum. The regulating body 
for these licenses is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is responsible 
for selling off spectrum for a given area (typically through an auction system), ensuring 
that no single MNO holds a monopoly over any given area (Federal Communications 
Commission [FCC], 2017). The MNO acquires network infrastructure and operates and 
manages it. The mobile telecommunication industry refers to these areas as the operational 
support system (OSS; Wakefield et al., 2007). The MNO supports a large swath of 
business, which creates the opening for specialized companies that focus around a single 
core competency, hence the existence of MVNOs. 
3. Mobile Virtual Network Operators  
A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) is a mobile service provider that do 
not own spectrum rights or (typically) network infrastructure. Rather, MVNOs purchase, 
rent, or—through some other agreement with MNOs—buy spectrum use to sell to their 
customers. The services MVNOs offer are similar to those of MNOs, but they offer 
additional benefits such as brand appeal (Michael & Salter, 2006). MVNOs that have had 
success are the ones whose operations are indistinguishable from those of an MNO. 
Independent MVNOs have the potential to offer product bundling that MNOs cannot 
match, such as a hypermarket MVNO offering a package of MVNO services along with 
other shopping rewards within the hypermarket. MVNOs have complete control over all 
facets of their operations, with customer service operations being just one example 
(Lehikoinen et al., 2014). 
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Typically, MVNOs target specific markets related to their business customer base 
through diversification of the mobile telecommunication market. An MVNO’s objective is 
to create a consumer of their mobile service. Within the MVNO market, there exist many 
different niche markets: low-cost MVNOs with no contracts (pay-as-you-go) leverage the 
MVNOs’ existing commercial service, marketing, and distribution and offer more 
aggressive prices, and cultural or age-related MVNOs (such as Boost or Jitterbug) target 
customers with specific backgrounds (Balon & Liau, 2012). 
In 2016, the largest MVNO was the American company TracFone Wireless 
(TracFone). However, other big tech companies have entered into the market. Google 
launched Project Fi, which capitalizes on the existing networks of T-Mobile and Sprint 
(FCC, 2017). Google Fi is innovative in the MVNO game because it automatically 
transitions between networks based on better coverage while also automatically connecting 
to Wi-Fi hotspots. Additionally, it is widely available globally, as it currently services over 
170 countries (Raphael, 2019).  
We have thus far talked about the role of the MNO and the role in a competitive 
market that the MVNO plays and how they provide service to their subscribers within their 
coverage area. Things get a little more complicated when users are outside their network 
coverage area, which the mobile telecommunication industry refers to as roaming. 
4. International Roaming 
Mobile service providers can offer coverage outside of the areas covered by their 
infrastructure through roaming arrangements, which give their end users the ability to 
automatically receive coverage from other mobile service providers’ networks. Where an 
MVNO purchases capacity wholesale to provide to its customer, a provider uses roaming 
services to market extended coverage for users living in its own coverage area but not to 
acquire new users living outside of it (FCC, 2017). Roaming enables a mobile subscriber 
to automatically perform all cellular functions that it would have access to under their own 
network.  
Roaming is reliant on agreements between network providers, with national roaming 
being based on agreements between providers within the same country and international 
17 
roaming being based on agreements between providers in different countries (Mauro & 
Arancibia, 2012). Figure 5 provides a visual representation of international roaming. 
 
Figure 5. International Roaming Overview. Source: Mauro & Arancibia 
(2012). 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) roaming allows a subscriber to 
roam in over 200 countries using one continuous phone and number (Faylor et al., 2012). 
The way this works is depicted in Figure 5. When the user is in a different country, their 
phone automatically attempts to connect with a local network. The visited network picks 
up the connection and automatically determines whether it is allowed within its own 
network, which is based on whether that customer’s network provider and this local 
provider have a preset roaming agreement. If so, the phone connects automatically to the 
local network (Mauro & Arancibia, 2012). All this is done seamlessly and instantaneously, 
so the user does not recognize any appreciable difference in service between their home 
network and that provided through the international partner. This ease of use does come at 
a high cost to the customer based on a number of factors.  
Across the board, prices remain very high for international roaming rates compared 
to those rates available through local national providers. Even though wholesale pricing on 
roaming has gone down, the prices for retail roaming rates have not (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013). International roaming is 
different from most telecommunication markets in that the wholesale and retail aspects are 
within separate countries. Numerous factors contribute to the unequally high prices that 
consumers pay for international roaming, including tariffs and fees related to the 
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agreements the mobile service providers have with their international partners (Faylor et 
al., 2012). While the number of mobile users has been increasing at a steady rate globally, 
the number of those users using international roaming has not increased at the same rate, 
which is yet another contributing factor to an unequal reduction in prices. Another factor 
that needs to be explored is how prices across the market may be affected in the future with 
technological advancements in mobile communications. The future lies in the 5G network. 
5. 5G and the Future of Mobile Telecommunication 
Previous generations of mobile networks have grown from allowing voice 
communication to providing internet access on our mobile devices. Fifth-generation (5G) 
technology is anticipated to fundamentally change the telecommunication industry (Marsch et 
al., 2018). 5G is also expected to enable the connection of many devices virtually, which the 
tech industry has come to describe as the Internet of Things (IoT), creating a single connected 
network (Calabuig et al., 2015). 5G is poised to be the center of the next telecommunication 
transformation, building on the previous successes of second-generation (2G), third-generation 
(3G), and 4G networks (Oughton et al., 2018). 
In theory, 5G networks can provide data rates 10 to 100 times faster with latencies 
of up to 10 times smaller than currently available with 4G networks. With better 
performance come better and more efficient technology, using more spectrum bandwidth 
and more network densification (Rost et al., 2015). 5G will move data faster, creating a 
significantly better customer experience—even providing an alternative to broadband 
services and opportunities for a new customer base. While much focus is on potential 5G 
speed, faster speeds do not necessarily equate to better customer experience (Pujol et al., 
2016). Besides offering a faster internet, a 5G experience is expected to offer possibilities 
heretofore unimagined. 
With its promise for increased performance, 5G also requires increased resources. 
America’s wireless companies have spent $275 billion on 5G research and infrastructure. 
Current estimates are that 5G technology will create three million jobs and infuse the economy 
with $500 billion (Global System for Mobile Communications Association [GSMA], 2019). 
The speed of transmission and low latency that 5G will offer will make wire lines as obsolete 
19 
as the telegraph, but to be successful in its development it will require investment from much 
more than just the mobile telecommunication industry in the infrastructure that will need to be 
built to support the new network. There not only needs to be infrastructure investment but also 
an expansion on the available spectrum, which has historically been reserved for military use, 
for radars and other such equipment, to allow the vast deployment of 5G (Vergun, 2019). 
While previous broadband technology could not meet military requirements, the 
military expects 5G to have massive potential for them (Kenyon, 2020). 5G provides 
reliability and security capabilities that previous broadband networks did not (Freedberg, 
2020). These capabilities mean that 5G will be key technology for the DOD. One example 
is Smart Base, which would use the IoT to send data between base installations (Temin & 
D’Itri, 2020). As more technology is used by the DOD, there is a burgeoning requirement 
to manage the data flow used by this technology, and the DOD’s investment in the future 
of 5G is integral to its successful implementation. This massive undertaking will not only 
require nontraditional players’ input but will also require cooperation among traditional 
service providers to build up the required infrastructure. Results will not just be an 
improved use and customer experience but may present new opportunities for how the end 
user chooses their service provider outside the traditional MNO and MVNO options. As 
the implementation of 5G networks becomes more global, the cost of using the 
infrastructure should be expected to decrease as competition and availability increase. As 
such, the agreements that the MNOs have with international partners should translate to 
lower costs for the customers using international roaming while abroad. Another potential 
area for savings is the potential for open network access that does not require users to have 
contracts with particular providers but to pay for use similar to the design of some MVNOs.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter III provides a relevant literature review covering federal contracting and 
the economics of the mobile telecommunication industry including the role of government 
regulations and the mobile market’s role in competition. 
A. FEDERAL CONTRACTING 
Besides the surrounding literature review on the telecommunication industry, a 
literature review on the Spiral 3 contract must also focus on the regulations that bind the 
contract, and all government contracts are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR). The FAR itself incorporates both federal acquisition law as well as any other 
additional guidance that is incorporated as a result of meetings from two separate councils, 
which are the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) Council and the Civilian Agency 
Acquisition (CAA) Council. Between the two councils, which hold representation from all 
major federal agencies, they determine the revisions to make through periodic updates of 
the FAR (FAR 1.2, 2019). Furthermore, DON contracts must adhere to two additional 
supplemental regulations. The first is the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS), which is a supplemental regulation to the FAR that all DOD 
agencies must follow in addition to the FAR. This instruction itself is overseen by the DAR 
Council (DFARS 201.2, 2020). Additionally, Navy contracting officers (KO) must also 
follow the Navy–Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS), which is 
itself a supplement to both the FAR and the DFARS. The NMCARS is administered and 
maintained by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Procurement 
(DASN[P]; NMCARS 5201.1, 2018). 
As a contract for commercial services, the Spiral 3 ensures compliance with the 
competition requirements of FAR Part 6 by maximizing full and open competition (FAR 
6.1, 2020). Full and open competition, “when used with respect to a contract action, means 
that all responsible sources are permitted to compete” (FAR 2.101, 2020). Competition in 
federal procurement goes as far back as 1781, when the federal government solicited 
multiple proposals from food suppliers for federal employees working in Philadelphia 
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(Manuel, 2011). Competition has often been seen as having many positive impacts by (a) 
promoting accountability by contracts getting picked on their own merits, (b) allowing the 
government to be good stewards of taxpayer money by buying the best goods at the 
cheapest prices, and (c) providing transparency to the taxpayer who can see that contracts 
are being awarded on a justified playing field via competition versus some type of 
favoritism by the government (Manuel, 2011). Although competition was recognized as 
favorable both as a policy goal and an avenue to achieve cost savings, the legislators who 
wrote the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA, 1984) did identify that maximum 
competition would eventually have diminishing returns and that there were reasonable 
exceptions to not having competition in some cases, so the verbiage “full and open” was 
used instead (Manuel, 2011).1 While there are certainly many potential exceptions to CICA 
and FAR Part 6, those exceptions cannot be unilaterally waived by the KO at their 
discretion, especially as the monetary thresholds of these contracts increase. Given that the 
price ceiling of the Spiral 3 contract is almost $1 billion, the only authority to waive CICA 
requirements at this threshold would be the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and 
sustainment (CICA, 1984).2  
The competition requirements for the Spiral 3 contract outlined in FAR Part 6 result 
directly not just from CICA but also from the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA, 1994). FASA was signed into law in 1994 and had a lot of influence on the MACs, 
of which Spiral 3 is one type. Under this contract model, multiple vendors are eligible to 
be awarded task orders for services. This is different from single award task order/delivery 
order (TO/DO) contracts, where multiple vendors all bid for a specific TO/DO contract, 
but once awarded to a single vendor, all TO/DOs written against that contract are provided 
by the specific vendor that originally won the award. Due to this, these single award 
contracts are sometimes called monopoly contracts (Manuel, 2011). MACs, on the other 
                                                 
1 FAR 6.2 (2020) and FAR 6.3 (2020) both highlight the exceptions to full and open competition as is 
typically mandated. FAR 6.2 highlights exceptions to full and open competition when a procurement can be 
set aside to specific sources rather than being open to full competition. FAR 6.3 highlights those occasions 
(e.g., when only one responsible source is available) where full and open competition is not required. 
2 Within the DON, this authority can be delegated down either to (a) any assistant secretary of defense 
or (b) an O-7 or higher or their GS equivalent (CICA, 1984). 
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hand, still provide another level of competition, by allowing multiple vendors within a 
specific MAC structure to all bid on each TO/DO that is up for an award. Language in the 
FASA also maintains a preference for MAC over single award TO/DO contracts due to 
this increased competition level (Manuel, 2011).  
As a service contract for commercially available wireless services, the Spiral 3 
contract falls under FAR Part 12 (2020), “Acquisition of Commercial Items.” Even if these 
commercial companies did have noncommercial services that were potentially available, 
the contracts themselves specifically cite that the services being acquired are for 
commercial products (SAM, 2017c). FAR Part 12 (2020) streamlines many acquisition 
requirements if the item is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), which makes the item easier 
and quicker to procure than non-COTS material and services. Additionally, the contract 
type mandated for COTS material is firm-fixed-price (FFP; FAR 12.2, 2020). This contract 
type provides the least risk to the government, as the contractor must deliver a product or 
service specified in the contract at an agreed-upon price, which is irrelevant to the actual 
costs that the contractor might end up accruing to execute the contract. Additionally, the 
contractor does not get paid at all if they do not deliver the product to the government.3 
The Spiral 3 contract, as currently set up, adheres to many of the central tenets of 
the FAR. It is important to highlight a few of these, as many potential contract solutions to 
the current issues with the Spiral 3 contract will need to share many of these same features. 
First, for costs to be allowable within a contract, they must be considered reasonable (FAR 
31.201, 2020). Reasonable is defined as a cost that “does not exceed that which would be 
incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business” (FAR 31.201, 2020). 
While not itself an automatic qualifier for a reasonable cost, competition goes a long way 
towards a cost being reasonable (i.e., one could imagine a scenario where a paper clip is 
quoted as being hundreds of dollars by multiple vendors, and while this paper clip has 
competition, none of these prices would be considered reasonable by a prudent person). In 
the case of the Spiral 3 contract, the costs provided by all vendors could then be compared 
                                                 
3 Under the other major type of contract model, cost reimbursement, the government takes on more 
risk as it shares costs with the contractor in the performance of the contract, regardless of whether a final 
product is ever actually delivered. 
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with not just each other but also with the rates provided by other vendors in the commercial 
marketplace for wireless services, providing more than enough justification to determine 
whether the costs within the Spiral 3 contract could be construed as reasonable.  
Besides the fact that competition is typically the best way to lower prices for 
government and that it is a great indicator that a cost is reasonable, competition also allows 
the government to avoid forcing contractors to provide costly certified cost and pricing 
data to the KO to show that the costs in their contract are current, accurate, and reliable. 
Two exceptions to this include if the items or services being procured are either (a) 
commercially available or (b) have adequate price competition (FAR 15.4, 2020). 
Adequate price competition requires that (a) there are at least two responsible offers, where 
responsible means that a vendor can perform the contract requirements as set in the 
solicitation; (b) the award is made based on best overall value but where price retains 
significant weight in the award decision; and (c) the price of the successful offeror is not 
otherwise unreasonable (FAR 15.4, 2020). Since the Spiral 3 contract meets both of these 
criteria, it does not force vendors to provide certified data, which would otherwise increase 
their upfront administrative costs in both time and money. Based on many of the central 
tenets of the FAR, the Spiral 3 contract provides a highly competitive, commercial solution 
to provide the best capability to the warfighter than it would already have while also taking 
advantage to attract more vendors and keep costs low. 
B. ECONOMICS OF THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY 
Competition is the cornerstone of any market, which is especially true for the 
mobile telecommunication industry. When multiple providers compete for customers, 
there is incentive to offer superior products and competitive pricing. In September 2017, 
the FCC released its 20th Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions 
with Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, which stated that 
“there is effective competition in the marketplace for mobile wireless services” (FCC, 
2017, p. 70). While there are differing opinions among those at the FCC, the industry, and 
the consumers on how they define effective, it is clear that competition is integral to the 
quality of service and innovation from mobile service providers. The economy in the 
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industry is shaped by government regulation, domestically and internationally, of mobile 
telecommunication and market forces. 
1. Government Regulation and Competition  
The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC to control the radio and 
telephone industry monopolies, such as Bell Telephones and AT&T. In the following years, 
the FCC often appeared as a special interest for the major telecommunication firms. Key 
elements of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 were meant to stop FCC protectionist 
behavior and deregulate the industry (FCC, 2013). Unfortunately, the act did not provide 
the FCC with the tools or legal authority to deregulate the industry. Following the passage 
of the Telecommunication Act (1996), the FCC created piles of new regulations but did 
not have much effect on creating a competitive market.  
In The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets, Thomas Philippon 
(2019) discusses how competition in the U.S. cellular market is artificially limited by 
corporate lobbying. He states that “competition has declined in most sectors of the U.S. 
economy [and] … the lack of competition is explained largely by policy choice influencing 
by lobbying and campaign finance contributions” (Philippon, 2019, p. 9). He argues that 
pro-competition policies could lead to increased cost savings for the American consumer 
without a decrease in service quality. This is arguably the purpose of the FCC, but 
regulations have failed to shape a truly competitive market in the United States.  
The interaction between technological advancement and regulation have had 
drastic effects on the industry as a whole. Essentially, protectionist regulations in favor of 
the big telecommunication companies have precipitated changes to the structure of the 
industry itself among the big companies, which has drastic implications on 
telecommunication technology advances. With such a highly regulated market, it is hard 
for newcomers to enter (Trubnikov, 2017). 
Entering the mobile telecommunication industry depends on the ability to obtain 
radio resources such as spectrum. Only very limited parts of the radio spectrum worldwide 
are freely available, with the most commercially viable radio resources being under 
government control, thereby making it impossible for newcomers to enter the industry and 
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provide disruption and competition. Even in the capitalist market society of the United 
States, it has always been social utility desired by the government that has allowed the big 
telecommunication companies to maintain a stranglehold on the industry (Trubnikov, 
2017). While competition promotion is often a goal in the U.S. market economy, the 
telecommunication industry’s market share is increasingly owned by only a few 
companies. Trubnikov has put forward the idea that 
regulation of telecommunication has evolved since the appearance of the 
industry, addressing its efforts to new issues that have been arising with the 
development of the technology. … The ideas that radio spectrum, or, at 
least, some of its parts, represents a common resource that should be 
returned to the realm of commons have become popular among many 
scholars. (Trubnikov, 2017, p. 414) 
This plays on some of the ideas of net neutrality, in that access to broadband should now 
be considered a human right, and the government regulation of who has access to spectrum 
is not just a question of economic policies but also social policies. 
The paper Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication 
Industry presents how political factors shape competition in the mobile telecommunication 
sector (Faccio & Zingales, 2017). Limited competition in the mobile telecommunication 
sector, particularly in the United States, drives mobile communication prices well above 
the price for the same quality service in similarly developed countries (Faccio & Zingales, 
2017). Faccio and Zingales (2017) establish connections between mobile service operators 
and politicians who create or support rules that limit competition in the mobile 
telecommunication sector through the process used by the FCC when selling available 
radio (spectrum) allocations: 
In designing regulation governments want to restrict competition to raise 
more revenues in the spectrum’s auctions. A necessary condition for this 
motive to be a relevant factor in regulation is that indeed less competition 
among mobile operators leads to higher revenues in spectrum auctions. 
Theoretically, it could go both ways. On the one hand, less competition 
means a higher value of the spectrum to the few winners. On the other hand, 
less competition also means fewer potential bidders to the auction. (Faccio 
& Zingales, 2017, p. 19) 
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Faccio and Zingales (2017) argue that the presence of rules that limit competition is 
associated with higher concentration, profit margins, and prices. Most importantly, 
globally they find that the presence and magnitude of the connections between mobile 
operators and the political system, either through lobbyists or even the regulators 
themselves, correlate negatively with the presence of pro-competition regulation (Faccio 
& Zingales, 2017). The lobbyists and politicians argue that limited competition results in 
better quality for the consumer:  
Yet, we do not find any evidence that rules that are more pro-competition 
lead to lower quality of service or decrease investments in the mobile 
telecommunications sector. If any, the evidence is mildly supportive of the 
opposite claim. Thus, pro-competition rules clearly benefit consumers, 
while hurting producers. (Faccio & Zingales, 2017, p. 4) 
Faccio and Zingales conclude that political connections create limited competition, 
with no clear efficiency or benefits. While these rules lead to higher profits for the industry 
and higher prices for consumers, there is no evidence that they lead to better quality, more 
investments, or higher wages (Faccio & Zingales, 2017). It is important to understand the 
political effects on limiting competition in the mobile telecommunication industry because 
more competition results in lower prices for the consumer and improved service. While 
global regulation strongly affects the level of competition in each country, it is further 
complicated when it comes to international roaming agreements.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2013) has 
recommended several measures that should be adopted globally to provide a more 
competitive market and better prices to the consumer. While international roaming rates 
have gone down in recent years, the international rates have not experienced the same 
downward trend as have national rates. Since the wholesale and retail markets for 
international roaming are in different countries, it is hard for individual country policy-
makers to affect forceful action to lower international roaming rates (OECD, 2013). 
Occasionally, national and international roaming rates can be comparable, such as 
in the United States, where there is no single nationwide provider of wireless services.  
The United States provides one example where an operator with access to 
lower wholesale rates coincided with a commercial desire to build retail 
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market share. AT&T Wireless had bought a mobile operator (McCaw 
Communications) and established a significant network footprint across the 
United States market which was larger than that of any of its competitors. 
(OECD, 2013, p. 10) 
For the most part, international roaming agreements are dependent on companies 
coming to usage agreements with other international mobile providers.  
Exceptions exist where strong trade agreements exist, such as within the European 
Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): “Some regions have effectively 
eliminated roaming on certain bilateral routes. However, such developments are normally 
the result of a combination of deep regional economic integration and a significant degree 
of operator integration across borders” (OECD, 2013, p. 23). The OECD has recommended 
that if countries are to attempt to artificially control prices, they will require immense 
cooperation with other countries given the current market structure.  
2. Market Competition  
The commercial mobile telecommunication ecosystem is a worldwide industry that 
contains subindustries and markets that operate in conjunction to provide a product to the 
customer. These subindustries, or regional industries, “are generally separated by 
geographic boundaries…the dynamics within industries in different regions can vary 
significantly due to a multitude of factors such as government regulations and consumer 
tastes” (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011, p. 11). Integral to understanding the space for market 
competition in the industry is the interplay of MNOs and MVNOs in creating competition 
and more opportunities for the customer as an interchangeable product.  
MVNOs are valuable to the industry as a whole, providing affordable rates to 
customers and profits to MNOs by utilizing their excess and unused bandwidth. An MVNO 
signs an agreement with an MNO to utilize all the same services that the MNO offers to its 
own customers. Hypothetically, this means that any company could act as an MVNO as 
long as they have the funding available to rent or buy what they need from the MNO 
(Ekanoye et al., 2018). The MVNO business model has historically been driven by three 
strategies: segmentation-driven strategy, network utilization–driven strategy, and product-
driven strategy. In segmentation-driven strategy, the MVNOs do not generate revenue for 
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MNOs but allow them to access market segments that they had not previously. In network 
utilization–driven strategy, an MVNO helps an MNO use excess capacity through targeted 
marketing. The product-driven strategy involves marketing to customers who have 
specialized service requirements (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011). 
The relationships between MNOs and MVNOs are easily created because of the net 
positive benefits for both entities. MNOs make money off excess bandwidth, and MVNOs 
sustain their business model (Ekanoye et al., 2018). One example of a successful MVNO 
was Virgin Mobile, utilizing Sprint Nextel as its MNO. Virgin Mobile ultimately had over 
four million subscribers (Le Cadre & Bouhtou, 2011).  
However, notwithstanding their initial success, MVNOs are not powerful in the 
retail market and have not lived up to their potential. This is mostly because MNOs sign 
restrictive contracts with MVNOs that limit their market share, most notably in foreign 
markets. More recently, voluntary partnerships between MVOs and MVNOs have formed, 
with MNOs focusing on those with good brand reputations or other high-value services (Le 
Cadre & Bouhtou, 2011). 
The economist Cricelli (2011) and his colleagues, in the paper “The Competition 
Among Mobile Network Operators in the Telecommunication Supply Chain,” explore the 
relationship of an MNO and MVNO and the impact they have on one another and the 
customer base as well. The supply of customers being unchanged, the MVNO finds an 
opportunity for increased revenue by using rented radio spectrum that would otherwise be 
a deadweight loss to the MNO. The study concludes, 
The results of the competition model have shown that when the MVNO is 
hosted by the incumbent, their collaborative strategy is advantageous for 
both of them, as their profits and market shares assume the maximum value 
for the other two possible relationships. Instead, when the MVNO is hosted 
by the follower, their network externality is lower than that in the previous 
situation; in fact, neither of them prefers to collaborate as they find evident 
advantages in a different relationship: the MVNO will prefer the 
“competitive” relationship, while it’s hosting (the follower) will prefer the 
“aggressive” relationship. (Cricelli et al., 2011, p. 29) 
The collaboration of the MNO and the MVNO is not just a win–win but also presents more 
opportunity to the customer base with more providers to choose from by creating more 
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competition. In the last decade, the mobile industry has experienced drastic changes in 
providers as more MVNOs have entered the market (Lescop & Isckia, 2010). There is an 
opportunity for the end user to leverage their buying power as the market grows and more 
players enter the industry.  
MNOs gain profits and value through their MVNOs’ brand reputations, due to their 
highest subscription bases. It can be argued that under certain demand and sales conditions, 
consumers can induce cost savings by leveraging excess MNO capacity. “As more 
operators adopt increasingly more capable radio access and core network technologies, 
they will gain the capacity to provide better services to users, but they will lose the ability 
to differentiate on that facet” (O’Neal & Dixon, 2011, p. 40). These circumstances give 
way to the possibility of increased rivalry among service providers in that MNOs may 
begin to seek increased revenues on their unused capacity when selling to MVNOs, 
creating a price competition among MNOs and MVNOs to maintain customers—creating 
savings for the end user. These concepts are explored in our analysis by comparing the data 
we examined from Spiral 3 contract user data and modeling for potential cost savings 




The necessary data for our analysis were provided to us by the Spiral 3 program 
director, Tine Thompson. Much of the analysis that we did was compiled from each 
vendor’s monthly J-018 reports, whereby vendors break out all their accounts by command 
and identified relevant metrics to track that included but were not limited to the following: 
• Total amount of spend per month 
• Recurring monthly plan costs 
• Taxes and fees 
• International roaming costs 
• Number of smartphones (IOS/Android/Blackberry) 
• Number of tablets 
• Number of air cards (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 
10, 2020) 
These J-018 reports were provided to us over a 14-month period, from May 2019 
through June 2020, with a couple of exceptions that we will explain as they arise for each 
vendor. Much of our focus on these reports were both on total spend and international 
roaming costs per each month under each vendor. We break this data out by each vendor 
in this chapter. 
The other main source of data we had was based on market research conducted by 
Tine Thompson with questions provided by us to each vendor. We have compiled these 
questions and their answers from each vendor. These data were integral to helping us make 
comparisons among the vendors on the differences in their international plans. In the 
following sections, we analyze the data of the four vendors, Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, 
and Sprint, that have contracts awarded under the Spiral 3 contract. We do not have any 
data on MetTel, the only MVNO on the Spiral 3 contract, as they have had no task orders 
awarded to them, and they did not provide any feedback to the market research 
questionnaire provided by Tine Thompson and NAVSUP FLC SD. 
One final source of data that we refer to in this chapter is the Spiral 3 Independent 
Government Estimate tool that NAVSUP FLC provides on their website to Spiral 3 
customers, which can be seen in Figure 6. This is one of the documents in the contracting 
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package that is required to be turned into a NAVSUP contracting shop before the 
contracting office can solicit bids from the Spiral 3 vendors for a command’s wireless and 
cellular services. A command inputs their estimated travel requirements for the base year 
of the contract and their expected wireless usage in each country for minutes and texts, and 
this price calculator uses proprietary formulas based on countries visited to generate a total 
estimated cost. There are also options for unlimited data/emails as can be seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Spiral 3 International Independent Government Estimate Price 
Calculator. Source: NAVSUP FLC SD (2020). 
Throughout this chapter, we identify sources of unavailable data that we attempted 
to get but that were not provided. Much of this inability was a direct impact of COVID-19. 
Many quarantine and shelter-in-place orders went into effect as we began our data 
collection efforts. While we were still able to collect some data, we did not have the same 
access to the data that we might have had under normal working conditions given that many 
of our sources were teleworking and did not have full access to the data that we needed as 
we were preparing this thesis.  
It should also be noted here that our inability to examine some potential cost drivers 
does not just have ramifications on our ability to do in-depth analysis in Chapter V but can 
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also have legal ramifications. Since all the task orders written under the Spiral 3 contract 
are for commercial items and services, they are necessarily firm-fixed-price contracts (FAR 
12.2, 2020). Not only do unknown or unforeseen costs drive up costs, they also potentially 
cause the government to violate the Antideficiency Act (1982). Since the international costs 
in the task order are a fixed price based on the government’s estimated usage for the life of 
that contract, if the government uses services above that contract, they must stop 
international usage on the contract. To pay for services that exceed the original amount in 
the contract prior to the contract being modified would be in violation of the Antideficiency 
Act, since these cost overages were never appropriated in the original contract. While the 
contractor technically is supposed to shut off service before the government accrues 
international overages, they are understandably reluctant to do so given the importance of 
the work that is being done by their end users within the DOD and the issues that may arise 
if service is disconnected, which puts the contractor in a very unfavorable predicament. 
A. VERIZON DATA 
Verizon currently holds the largest number of task orders under the Spiral 3 
contract. From the beginning of our data period in June 2019, they had 455 accounts, while 
by the end of our data period in June 2020, they had 480 accounts (T. Thompson, personal 
communication, August 10, 2020). The average total spend across all these accounts during 
this time period was $2,749,200.43 a month. Figure 7 graphically shows the spend level 
across all accounts for each month from June 2019 through June 2020. While we had partial 
data for May 2019 for Verizon, we did not have any international wireless cellular data for 




1. Spiral 3 Trends 
Figure 7 graphically shows the spend level across all accounts for each month from 
June 2019 through June 2020. While we had partial data for May 2019 for Verizon, we did 
not have any international wireless cellular data for this period that we were able to analyze, 
so we omitted the partial data so as not to skew our analysis. 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 7. Verizon Total Spend (May 2019–June 2020).  
In both accounts and total spend, Verizon currently is the leading vendor among all 
its competitors under the Spiral 3 contract. In order to determine how their international 
rates affected their total expense levels, we next took the total spend levels while overlaying 
international spend data to determine the percentage of international costs against total 
spend across all accounts. Figure 8 identifies absolute dollar totals for both international 
spend and total spend for all accounts that had international charges combined for each 
month while also denoting overall percentage of international spend compared to total 
spend. The total dollar figures identified in Figure 8 differ slightly from Figure 7 since not 
every Verizon account used international services. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 8. Verizon International Costs from June 2019–June 2020. 
On average throughout this data period, international roaming costs for Verizon 
amounted to an average of 5.15% ($95,654.43) of their total spend per month, with the 
highest percentage being 8.28% in October 2019 and a low of 1.89% in June 2020. 
Additionally, based on the data we had on international charges, we also broke out the top 
10 commands who had the largest spend total with Verizon across our data range, which 
is shown in Figure 9 below. Table 1 identifies the data from which Figure 9 was built. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 9. Verizon Top 10 Commands’ International Spend. Adapted from T. 
Thompson (personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
Table 1. Verizon Top 10 International Spend Accounts. Adapted 
from T. Thompson (personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
 
For these commands, international spending was, on average, 9.2% of their monthly 
total spend. We also saw a high degree of variance in international roaming costs as a 
percentage of total spend for these commands. Notably, Marine Corps Forces South 
(MARFORSOUTH), the Marine combatant commander for U.S. Southern Command, had 
international roaming charges that were 69.5% of their total spend ($78,988.58 in 
international charges with total spend of $113,629.00), while the Trident Refit Facility, a 
Command Sum of Inter. Spend Sum of Total Spend % of Inter. Spend
NA AIR WARFARE CENTER AD $174,046.75 $2,102,764.58 8.28%
TRIDENT REFIT FACILITY $111,944.75 $154,522.56 72.45%
NIWC LANT $104,520.42 $1,471,933.30 7.10%
NSWC INDIAN HEAD $82,095.90 $459,103.73 17.88%
MARFORSOUTH $78,988.58 $113,629.20 69.51%
PEO EIS TECH APPLICATIONS OFC $48,034.46 $547,265.11 8.78%
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD $44,118.42 $1,419,562.89 3.11%
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP 2 $30,752.35 $181,847.83 16.91%
COMNAVAIRPAC $25,834.90 $257,439.10 10.04%
NAVAL RESEARCH LAB  $24,486.20 $403,784.21 6.06%
RECEIVING OFFICER $23,725.95 $1,054,980.75 2.25%
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Navy maintenance command in King’s Bay, GA, had international roaming charges that 
were 72.5% of their total spend ($111,944.75 in international charges with total spend of 
$154,522.56). 
To help put this data into context, we also need to analyze it against Verizon’s 
current rate offerings under the Spiral 3 account. Verizon currently offers the Navy models 
that appear to be tailored from two of their different commercially available plans, which 
are highlighted in Figures 10 through 12. 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, July 20, 2020. 
Figure 10. Verizon Spiral 3 International Wireless Rates.  
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, July 20, 2020. 
Figure 11. Verizon Spiral 3 International Country Breakdown. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, July 20, 2020. 
Figure 12. Verizon Spiral 3 Data-Only Device Country Rates. 
2. International Roaming Fee Structure 
Based on the figures provided as market research by Verizon, one of the biggest 
cost savers that the Navy gains access to, which is not available in Verizon’s commercial 
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accounts, is an unlimited wireless data allowance for smartphones, after paying a $16 
monthly access fee, as can be seen in Figure 10. This mirrors Verizon’s two monthly 
international plans in terms of format, where a flat buy-in cost gives the customer access 
to an international package. However, Verizon’s commercial accounts for their monthly 
plans have access fees that are either $70 or $130, and neither of these plans offers 
unlimited data (Verizon, 2020). 
Verizon’s voice plan under the Spiral 3 contract is also similar to another one of 
their commercial international plans, which is their Pay as You Go plan. In their 
commercial model, countries are split into two zones, with Zone 1 holding approximately 
130 countries, where each minute costs $1.79, and Zone 2 with all other countries, where 
each minute costs $2.99. These zones roughly correspond with the eight zones under the 
Spiral 3 contract seen in Figure 11, with Zones 1a–1e corresponding with Zone 1 of the 
commercial plan and Zones 1f–2 corresponding with Zone 2 of the commercial plan. 
Again, here as with smartphone data usage, Spiral 3 DOD customers with Verizon can 
experience significant cost savings relative to their commercial counterparts. Only the most 
expensive zone in the Spiral 3 plan, Zone 2, which consists of only 14 countries in the 
Spiral 3 plan, has more expensive rates for voice minutes than any of the rates Verizon 
offers to its commercial customers under its Pay as You Go plan. 
The other main offering by Verizon for Spiral 3 customers is its data-only plan, 
which really has no commercial equivalent, as seen in Figure 11. This data plan is 
specifically offered for all data-only devices, with all smartphones being excluded. The 
plan is offered under four different price points with larger price breaks per megabyte (MB) 
of data as larger blocks of data are pre-bought. The overage rate of $2.05 per MB is 
identical to the data overage rate charged by Verizon on its other international plans that it 
offers commercially (Verizon, 2020). 
While these data are essential in the next chapter during the data analysis, there 
were some data that would have been fruitful that we were unable to get. Notably, we were 
unable to get any bills from Verizon that would have helped us analyze the charges for 
commands each month. This was especially critical for some of the top 10 commands 
mentioned earlier that had high international spending charges and/or a high percentage of 
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international charges relative to total spend levels. By having access to bills from these 
commands, we would have been able to pinpoint how these wireless charges originated 
(e.g., voice minutes, data overages on data-only devices, etc.). 
Another cost driver that is unknown to us is Verizon’s process for international data 
charges. The Spiral Independent Government Estimate (IGE) in Figure 6 does have a 
column where the customer can give their estimated number of phones that require 
unlimited international data/email, and the rate given by NAVSUP FLC SD for this is one 
phone at $16/month, which corresponds to the international access fee offered by Verizon 
that can be seen in Figure 11. If we had access to specific accounts, we would have been 
able to analyze this as a potential cost driver. For example, if a command wanted 40 phones 
with 12 months each of unlimited email and data, according to the IGE price calculator, 
that would be approximately $480 in access charges alone. However, if a command then 
needed another 40 phones to have international services for 12 months and turned their 
international services on, that would presumably be another $480.4 Without access to this 
information, we are unable to determine if this could have been a cost driver, and it is a 
cost driver that would have real-world applicability. A shore-based operational command 
not expecting to deploy in the next 12-month period might have estimated their usage at 
20 cell phones needing international service.  
Finally, one other unknown cost driver is Verizon’s data-only plans. We were 
unsure which data plan was chosen, and we were not able to determine if this was picked 
by the government KO writing the contract or if this was arbitrarily provided to the 
customer at Verizon’s discretion. Either way, both cases could lead to multiple cost 
overages. For example, if the government underestimated its international usage on data-
only devices, it might have picked cheaper data plans with less data provided in order to 
keep the overall contract price down. If the end user went over this data limit, the cost to 
                                                 
4 This also assumes that any additional international services charged that were not originally 
estimated in the IGE would still be charged under the same pricing plan. Verizon’s Spiral 3 contract does 
not lock in international pricing but only specifies that any price given to a customer under a Spiral 3 
contract could not be more than what they charge other federal, state, or local government agencies (SAM, 
2017c). If a command wanted to lock in a specific international pricing scheme, this would have to be done 
at the task order level, if it could be done under Spiral 3. 
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the government would most likely have been much higher than it would have been under 
another more expensive data plan due to the high cost in overage fees a command would 
now have to pay. Conversely, if Verizon chose which data plan to provide, they could 
provide a lower cost to the government to (a) make their bid appear more competitive 
compared to other Spiral 3 vendors and (b) potentially increase their profit ratio if the 
government did go over their allotted data plan. 
B. AT&T DATA 
After Verizon, AT&T holds the largest number of task orders under the Spiral 3 
contract. Their trends will be examined next. 
1. Spiral 3 Trends 
At the beginning of the period our data encompasses, May 2019, AT&T had 360 
accounts. By the end of this period, June 2020, they maintained 372 accounts (T. 
Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). The average total spend across all 
accounts during this time period was $1,310,341.78 a month. Figure 13 graphically shows 
the spend level for all accounts for each month from May 2019 through June 2020. 
.  
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 13. AT&T Total Spend (May 2019–June 2020).  
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Just like with the other vendors, we also compared international spend totals for 
AT&T Spiral 3 accounts. Figure 14 shows the percentage of international roaming costs 
per month for the AT&T data period, May 2019 through June 2020, while also showing 
the international spend percentage compared to total spend of accounts that had 
international usage for all AT&T accounts each month. 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020 
Figure 14. AT&T International Costs from May 2019–June 2020. 
Of the four Spiral 3 vendors that have been awarded task orders, AT&T shows the 
highest variance in international spend as a percentage of total spend in the data period that 
we examined. While international spend totals accounted for a monthly average of 14.39% 
of total spend throughout the data period, this percentage was as low as 6.73% in May 2020 
and as high as 21.25% in February 2020 (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 
10, 2020). As with all the other Spiral 3 vendors, we also broke out the top 10 accounts 
with the most international spend to identify and analyze any potential trends of the 
accounts with the most international wireless use. This is highlighted in Figure 15. Table 
2 is the data table on which Figure 15 was built. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020 
Figure 15. AT&T Top 10 Commands’ International Spend from May 2019–
June 2020. 
Table 2. AT&T Top 10 International Spend Accounts. 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, some commands had international spend totals that made 
up the majority of their total sum spent on wireless services. Notably, the 26th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (26TH MEU M20181 U.S. GOV) and the Marine Corps Security Force 
Battalion (MARCORSECFORBN) had over 80% of their total spend for the year be 
consumed by their international wireless fees. At least in the case of the 26th MEU, their 
international spend coincides with a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) deployment 
from December 2019 to July 2020 (Heisterberg, 2020). In comparing the data to this 
Command Sum of Inter. Spend Sum of Total Spend % of Inter. Spend
26TH MEU M20181 US GOV $227,447.59 $272,187.89 83.56%
NAVFAC $189,870.05 $2,328,046.82 8.16%
NCIS $185,038.83 $814,751.52 22.71%
3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING $147,962.19 $336,397.24 43.98%
NSWC PORT HUENEME $138,419.50 $506,727.01 27.32%
SPAWAR SYSTEMS CENTER, PACIFIC $122,725.73 $778,980.58 15.75%
MARCORSECFORBN $120,356.44 $149,841.06 80.32%
NAVSEA HQ $118,966.40 $1,672,154.23 7.11%
NAVAIR WARCENWD CHINA LAKE $60,832.08 $803,326.71 7.57%
NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CARDEROCK $59,600.60 $335,567.23 17.76%
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deployment, the first three full months of this deployment, January through March 2020, 
the 26th MEU had monthly international charges of $51,770,56; $91,339.73; and 
$67,731.89, respectively (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
2. International Roaming Fee Structure 
In their market research response to NAVSUP FLC SD, AT&T gave the following 
as the available plans they offered for international services under the Spiral 3 contract: 
• Day Pass, Unlimited Voice/Data/Text in 200+ Countries ($10 per day 
of use) - FFP 
• Passport Pro Data Only ($200/month for 10 GB data, no overages) - 
FFP 
• Unlimited International Data for Smartphones ($16/month) 
• Data Only, 1.5 GB for MiFi Devices ($123.50/month) 
• International Texting Plans (50 messages/$9.50, 200 Messages/$28.50, 
500 messages/$47.50) 
• World Traveler (price per minute varies by country of use) 
• World Connect Voice Plan ($3.50/month/line; T. Thompson, personal 
communication, August 10, 2020) 
Similar to Verizon, much of AT&T’s offerings under the current Spiral 3 contract 
are modeled after their current existing plans, with some of them being identical, such as 
the Day Pass offering, which is also offered as an unlimited international commercial 
option at $10 per day (AT&T, 2020a). Their Passport Pro Data Only plan is a variant of 
their commercial Passport Pro plan, which is offered at 2 gigabytes (GB) for $70/month or 
6GB for $130/month but also includes unlimited international texting and a flat rate of 
$0.35 per minute on international calls (AT&T, 2020a). While the government gets more 
GB per dollar under the Passport Pro Data Only, they do not get price breaks for voice 
minutes or texts under this plan. Similarly, the World Connect Voice Plan is a similar 
model to a commercial voice plan that is offered commercially at $15 a month (AT&T, 
2020). However, the countries under the World Connect Voice Plan were not provided to 
us, so it is unknown if these are identical plans that are offered to the government at a 
discount. Additionally, these plans have somewhat of a limited utility for DON personnel 
operating overseas, as they are tailored towards international calls originating from 
CONUS to another country. 
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One interesting divergence in plans offered is the World Traveler plan. The only 
commercial equivalent we could find was a World Traveler plan that was retired by AT&T 
in 2012, although it is still carried as a legacy plan for those accounts that held it at the time 
of its retirement. This plan offered discounted per-minute rates, with the cost and rate 
varying by country (AT&T, 2016). Given that AT&T provided NAVSUP FLC SD no other 
data, it is impossible to discern what pricing structure is offered under the Spiral 3 plan, 
and if it was similar or identical to the plan that was originally offered commercially. 
AT&T provides links for its international rates on its customer support page for Spiral 3 
customers, but currently none of these links are operable. From a contracting perspective, 
not having the data available on what the international rates are from AT&T presents 
significant issues in understanding what they are billing the customer and in ensuring that 
they are being charged appropriately. While not getting the particulars of their proprietary 
agreements with their international partners is understandable and to be expected, not 
getting the rates that the customers are actually being charged needs to be addressed.  
AT&T also offers a monthly unlimited international data for smartphones at 
$16/month that is not offered commercially, which does not include texts or voice minutes, 
both of which are offered under the separate fee structures mentioned above. This 
$16/month flat fee for international services under the Spiral 3 contract is identical to the 
plan that is offered by Verizon. AT&T, like Verizon, also offers a data-only plan for data-
only devices.  
Just like with Verizon, we were unable to get any bills for AT&T that would have 
helped us analyze the charges for commands each month. This causes many of the same 
problems in analyzing AT&T data that it does for Verizon. Since AT&T has multiple 
different pricing plans for international voice minutes, texts, and data, and without bills, 
we have no way of knowing how these have been charged to their customers. Additionally, 
AT&T states on their Spiral 3 page that customers can change their pricing structure for 
international plans on their Spiral 3 support page (AT&T, 2020b). Since only the final 
estimate for international services is incorporated into a Spiral 3 task order as a firm fixed 
total, it does appear that customers currently have the leeway and flexibility to change their 
rate plans as they deem fit.  
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However, like with Verizon, this leads to other underlying questions. Notably, since 
AT&T offers multiple pricing plans for international services that the customer does not 
pick by default, how does AT&T charge for these international services? Of their available 
plans, do they pick the one that provides the most cost savings to the government or the 
one that gives them the most value for their money that they have obligated under their 
Spiral 3 task order? Do they standardize all Spiral 3 task orders with a default international 
plan, which the customer can then change to suit their specific needs? Or does AT&T pick 
the plans that, based on the estimates, will maximize their profits? Like with Verizon, it is 
impossible to determine without being able to analyze detailed bills.  
C. T-MOBILE DATA 
After AT&T, T-Mobile holds the next largest number of task orders under the 
Spiral 3 contract, but they hold significantly fewer than both Verizon and AT&T. At the 
beginning of the period our data encompasses, September 2019, T-Mobile had 44 accounts. 
By the end of this period, June 2020, they maintained 53 accounts (T. Thompson, personal 
communication, August 10, 2020). The average total spend across all accounts during this 
time period was $135,623.57 a month. Figure 16 graphically shows the spend level for all 
accounts for each month from September 2019 through June 2020. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 16. T-Mobile Total Spend (September 2019–June 2020). 
1. Spiral 3 Trends 
In both accounts and total spend, T-Mobile’s numbers pale in comparison to 
Verizon and AT&T, who hold the lion’s share of accounts under the Spiral 3 contract. 
Nonetheless, to have an objective comparison of providers, and in order to determine how 
their international rates affected their total expense levels, we took the total spend levels 
while overlaying international spend data to determine the percentage of international costs 
against total spend across all accounts that had international usage. Figure 17 identifies 
absolute dollar totals for both international spend and total spend for each month while also 
denoting overall percentage of international spend compared to total spend. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 17. T-Mobile International Costs from September 2019–June 2020. 
Adapted from T. Thompson (personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
On average throughout this data period, international roaming prices for T-Mobile 
amounted to an average of 3.80% ($3,923.92) of their total spend per month, with the 
highest percentage being 7.60% in March 2020 and a low of 1.87% in June 2020. 
Additionally, based on the data we had on international charges, we also broke out the top 
10 commands who had the largest spend total with T-Mobile across our data range, which 
is shown in Figure 18 and Table 3. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 18. T-Mobile Top 10 Commands’ International Spend.  
Table 3. T-Mobile Top 10 Commands’ International Spend  
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
 
For these commands, international spending was, on average, 9.89% of their 
monthly total spend. We also saw a large degree of variance in international roaming costs 
as a percentage of total spend for these commands. Notably, the Underwater Construction 
Team One (UCT 1) is based out of Virginia Beach, VA, but has three Construction Dive 
Detachments that deploy worldwide to conduct underwater construction, inspection, repair, 
and demolition. UCT 1 had international roaming charges that were 28.39% of their total 
spend ($3,291.80 in international charges with total spend of $11,592.91). U.S. Marine 
Forces Central Command, the Marine Corps component of the CENTCOM combatant 
command based out of Tampa, FL, sends forward deployed personnel to the Middle East 
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and had international roaming charges that were 13.87% of their total spend ($740.20 in 
international charges with total spend of $5,336.08). 
2. International Roaming Fee Structure 
Unlike Verizon and AT&T, T-Mobile uses a much more straightforward fee 
structure. T-Mobile uses their Simple Global feature that is included in the ELIN structure. 
Simple Global provides unlimited texts and data in more than 210 countries and territories. 
Voice minutes are just $0.20 per minute in these same locations. This allows the end user 
to travel to any of these 210 plus countries without having to make any modifications to 
existing task orders in order to add or delete an international feature. The end user just 
deploys, and the services work accordingly. The Simple Global rates are $42.30 per line 
per month. (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020).  
There are only a handful of countries that do not fall within the Simple Global plan 
that have resulted in higher international roaming charges for DON users, including Libya 
($5.99/day), Djibouti ($4.19/day), Ethiopia ($4.19/day), and Lebanon ($3.59/day), which 
have potential to create significant charges, especially for those commands that regularly 
operate in those areas (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
 The international rates provided by T-Mobile under the Spiral 3 are consistent over 
the life of the Spiral 3 master contract and do not change from task order to task order. 
Additionally, T-Mobile’s international unlimited text and data service in the previously 
mentioned Simple Global feature is included at no additional charge, so there are no 
overages on these services as experienced with other providers under Spiral 3. The 
International high-speed data features include 1.5GB, 5GB, or 10GB of data respectively; 
once this threshold is reached then the line reverts to standard speeds until the end of the 
bill cycle and then resets (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). No 
overages are incurred as part of the high-speed data options either, because using more than 
the allotted high-speed data amount is not an option, which is an ancillary benefit as there 
is no risk of incurring large overage charges and becoming anti-deficient. 
While these data will be essential in the next chapter during the data analysis, there 
were some data that would have been fruitful that we were unable to get. Similar to the 
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data we were unable to receive from other service providers, we were not able to receive 
bills from T-Mobile to provide a more granular review. The detail behind the specific cost 
drivers, similar to those previously mentioned, would have provided for a more thorough 
analysis and a better understanding of what is producing the inordinate international 
roaming charges, particularly for the commands who are seeing their international roaming 
costs as a much higher percentage of their total spend than that of the average user. 
D. SPRINT DATA 
Besides MetTel, who has yet to be awarded any task orders since joining the Spiral 
3 contract, Sprint has had the fewest contracts since joining Spiral 3 in October 2019, 
receiving their first DON task order in January 2020. At the beginning of the period our 
data encompasses, February 2020, Sprint had only 2 accounts. By the end of this period, 
June 2020, they had been awarded an additional 10 task orders, for a total of 12 accounts 
(T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). The average total spend across 
all accounts during this time period was $2,363.25 a month. Figure 19 graphically shows 
the spend level for all accounts for each month from February 2020 through June 2020. 
 
Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 19. Sprint Total Spend (February 2020–June 2020)  
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1. Spiral 3 Trends 
In both accounts and total spend, Sprint holds only a miniscule number of DON 
accounts under the Spiral 3 contract due to Sprint’s relative newness as a Spiral 3 vendor. 
Additionally, unlike Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile, Sprint has not had any of their account 
holders have any requirements for international roaming services, so a similar comparison 
is not possible at this point with the current data available for DON users. This is most 
likely due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and commands being unable to utilize 
international roaming when they typically would have.  
Notably, Navy Trident Refit Facility opened a new account with Sprint in June 
2020 and had previously used Verizon as their service provider under the Spiral 3 contract. 
Under their Verizon account, Trident Refit Facility had been one of the top 10 in total 
spend for international roaming and as a percentage of their total spend during the period 
we had reviewed. It will be interesting to see their usage and costs going forward with 
Sprint in comparison to what they had been spending with Verizon. 
2. International Roaming Fee Structure 
Market research questions were sent out to Sprint government contract 
representatives from the Spiral 3 manager at NAVSUP FLC SD to better understand the 
international roaming fee structure that Sprint uses to bill the government. Similar to T-
Mobile, Sprint uses a much more straightforward fee structure. Sprint offers the Sprint 
Global Roaming plan, included at no additional cost, as part of the domestic plans offered. 
Sprint Global Roaming allows for international roaming coverage in more than 200 
countries, and texts and data are included freely with their domestic ELINs, with calls 
priced at only $0.25 per minute (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020). 
In addition to the Sprint Global Roaming plan, Sprint has developed custom international 
price plans, which are shown in Figure 20. The smartphone plan for unlimited international 
roaming voice and data, priced at only $29.99 per line, is the most reasonably priced of all 
the service providers’ plans available under the Spiral 3 master contract. 
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Adapted from T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020. 
Figure 20. Sprint Spiral 3 Global Roaming Plan. 
While the list of countries covered by Sprint international roaming services is 
extensive, there are a limited number of countries where service is unavailable—in 
particular, countries around the Horn of Africa. DON commands that operate in these 
countries may require service that cannot be received through Sprint. Some of these 
countries have service available at much higher rates through other providers, but it is 
service nonetheless.  
Sprint negotiates international roaming rates with partner carriers across the globe 
to provide their customers the most economical rates. Under the Spiral 3 master contract, 
Sprint rates remain the same for the duration of the task order period of performance and 
for the life of the overall Spiral 3 master contract, even if the rate Sprint is charged by the 
third party changes. Additionally, Sprint’s prices charged to the DON are consistent with 
those offered to other federal, state, and local government entities for similar services with 
comparable terms and conditions. Civilian business accounts are not a reasonable 
comparison due to unique government customer requirements and regulations, including 
termination for non-appropriation and termination for convenience without penalty (T. 




As we stated in the previous chapter, we were unable to get bills and invoices from 
commands that had accounts with any of the major wireless providers under the Spiral 3 
account. Our original intention to compare data rates among all the providers was to use 
actual bills from a command and then see how much the command was charged under its 
actual provider and how much it potentially could have been charged under the other 
wireless service providers. From there, we would have determined which plans might have 
provided the most cost savings to the customer. However, what we did have from most 
vendors, besides AT&T, were the rates that they charged under the Spiral 3 contract, which 
we received as a result of the market research that had been conducted by the Spiral 3 
program manager at NAVSUP FLC SD. AT&T did not provide those rates during the 
market research. However, AT&T does provide Not to Exceed (NTE) rates that they are 
not allowed to go over (T. Thompson, personal communication, September 9, 2020). 
Additionally, in our modeling, we did add an MVNO, Google Fi, into our price comparison 
to see how adding additional competition would compare against the current Spiral 3 
providers. To do this, we used Google Fi’s commercial plans as a starting rate (Google Fi, 
2020).  
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
Before going into the hypothetical model, we provide here all the planning 
assumptions for usage patterns of a hypothetical command and data rates for each provider 
that we used to build a price comparison on identical usage patterns across all plans. 
1. Proposed Usage Patterns 
Our usage patterns for hypothetical commands were based on two main factors. 
The first factor was the size of the command, which we broke out based on analysis of the 
number of phones commands had in their custody that we could analyze from their 
collective J-018 parts. The trends we noticed were that commands either had a very small 
number of phones (e.g., a command on a U.S. ship), or they were typically a shore 
command or shore-based operational command, with a larger requirement for cellular 
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phones. Based on these data, we came up with three different command sizes to analyze, 
which were as follows: 
• Small Commands: 10 phones 
• Medium Commands: 100 phones 
• Large Commands: 300 phones 
Next, we had to determine international usage for commands to analyze. This is 
where we had no data to base our assumptions on, because the J-018 reports did not break 
out which phones had international services and which did not; the reports only gave the 
total international monthly spend that a command had. This meant that we needed a 
workable assumption that would adequately highlight cost drivers among the existing 
Spiral 3 plans. One definite cost driver in two of the Spiral 3 plans, AT&T and Verizon, 
was a flat “buy-in” monthly fee to use unlimited international data, so given this, we 
decided to break out three different percentages for each command size to highlight this 
access fee charge as a cost driver as more phones are added. Again, given that we had no 
granular, historical data to pull from, but wanting to explore this cost driver, we settled on 
three percentages that we felt were distinct enough to examine this cost driver. For each 
command size, we would identify costs when 30% of a command’s phone inventory had 
international services, when 50% of a command’s phone inventory had international 
services, and when 70% of a command’s phone inventory had international services. 
Finally, we had to come up with modeling assumptions for usage rates for both 
texts and voice minutes, the other two cost drivers for international services provided by 
Spiral 3 vendors. Again, we had no granular, historical data to pull from for these either, 
but—like with international data—what was more important was not so much examining 
historical data but highlighting the difference between cost drivers among all Spiral 3 
vendors and Google Fi. We did align voice/text usage with international data usage, in that 
we assumed that for any given command the more phones they had with international data, 
the more minutes and texts those commands would use. Since some commands had 
different rates for incoming and outgoing texts, we also assumed that there was a reciprocal 
relationship between texting so that for every text sent, one was received and vice versa. 
Given these assumptions, we were able to create nine distinct models to use in order to 
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examine international pricing among the current Spiral 3 vendors and Google Fi. All 
minutes and texts are pooled among all phones with international data. The models are as 
follows: 
• Small Commands: 10 phones  
• 30% [3] phones with data, 100 voice minutes, 10 texts  
• 50% [5] phones with data, 200 voice minutes, 20 texts 
• 70% [7] phones with data, 300 voice minutes, 30 texts 
 
• Medium Commands: 100 phones  
• 30% [30] phones with data, 200 voice minutes, 40 texts 
• 50% [50] phones with data, 400 voice minutes, 80 texts 
• 70% [70] phones with data, 600 voice minutes, 120 texts 
 
• Large Commands: 300 phones 
• 30% [90] phones with data, 400 voice minutes, 200 texts 
• 50% [150] phones with data, 800 voice minutes, 400 texts 
• 70% [210] phones with data, 1200 voice minutes, 600 texts 
 
For all vendors, we ran their data rates through each model just described to get 
both an estimated international spend total for each model for each vendor as well as total 
spend based on the actual figures for domestic services that would have to be procured 
along with the international services in each model (i.e., if a small command had 10 phones, 
we would identify how much an international plan cost under a specific model in addition 
to the cost to procure those 10 phones and associated lines). 
2. Data Rates 
Before going into the modeling, we must go over the data rates that would be 
proscribed to each vendor. The rates themselves were already laid out in Chapter IV, but 
for some, such as voice minutes, the prices can vary based on location. Due to this, we first 
had to come up with a suitable international location that has a continuous DON presence. 
Given this criterion, we deemed the most suitable location to be Bahrain. Bahrain is the 
location of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT), 
which is the naval component for CENTCOM. Due to this, Bahrain sees a major influx of 
deployed and temporarily assigned personnel, with these personnel using their command-
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provided cellular phones procured under the Spiral 3 contract to conduct official business. 
This planning assumption should not have a drastic effect on pricing, however, since—
with the exception of Verizon—all the other vendors had standardized rates for voice 
minutes and texts.5 For Bahrain, Verizon charges $0.24 per voice minute. However, as 
seen in Figure 11, in some countries Verizon charges much lower rates for voice minutes. 
In order to better control for this cost driver, we also ran an additional data analysis on the 
large model with 70% usage, except with the country being Japan instead of Bahrain. Japan 
is another location with a large DON presence, and Verizon charges $0.05 minute to Spiral 
3 customers for voice minutes in Japan, lower than any other vendor. 
Based on these planning assumptions, these are the rates that we use for each vendor 
as we conduct our models for data, texts, and voice minutes. Unless otherwise stated for 
each service provided by a vendor, all rates are standardized: 
• T-Mobile 
o Monthly Access Fee for Unlimited Data: $0.00 
o Voice Minute: $0.20 
o Outgoing Text: $0.00 / Incoming Text: $0.00 
 
• Verizon 
o Monthly Access Fee for Unlimited Data: $16.00 
o Voice Minute: $0.24 (Bahrain) / $0.05 (Japan) 
o Outgoing Text: $0.50 / Incoming Text: $0.05 
 
• AT&T (Based on NTE Prices Under the Spiral 3 Contract) 
o Monthly Access Fee for Unlimited Data: $16.00 
o Voice Minute: $2.00 
o Outgoing Text: $0.50 / Incoming Text: $0.05 
 
• Sprint 
o Monthly Access Fee for Unlimited Data: $0.00 
o Voice Minute: $0.25 
o Outgoing Text: $0.00 / Incoming Text: $0.00 
  
                                                 
5 This might not be technically true for AT&T, but since they would not provide their Spiral 3 rates, 
they are based on the NTE pricing under the Spiral 3 contract, which is standardized. 
59 
• Google Fi 
o Monthly Access Fee for Unlimited Data: $0.00 
o Voice Minute: $0.20 
o Outgoing Text: $0.00 / Incoming Text: $0.00 
For Sprint, we assumed people would pay for voice minutes separately vice buying 
an unlimited talk and data plan, as seen in Figure 20, given how relatively cheap their voice 
minutes were. 
B. MODELING ANALYSIS 
The completed results of our modeling analysis can be found in Appendices A and 
B. Appendix A contains all the raw totals of our modeling analysis that were already 
provided in Section A of this chapter. However, these raw data numbers as they are would 
not actually give an accurate picture on their own. Commands were broken out in the 
modeling analysis based on size, and—unsurprisingly—the bigger commands ended up 
paying more for services. Additionally, the price differences between the vendors only 
increased during this analysis as the model moved from small commands to large 
commands.  
Taken on its own, it might then look like there was a bigger disparity between the 
vendors than there is in actuality, as most commands are not as large as our largest model. 
Given this, the totals among all the different models then had to be weighted to give a 
weighted average of total costs across all nine models. These are outlined in Appendix B. 
We weighted the average among each group size (e.g., Small Commands 1–3) and 
provided a weighted average among all nine models, both with individualized cost 
breakouts for each component as well as a weighted average of cost totals among each 
vendor. The weighted average, to have some predicative use, needs to reflect the actual 
sizes of the commands currently under the Spiral 3 contracts across all vendors. Based on 
our analysis of current task orders under this contract, 60% of the commands meet the 
description of a small command, 30% meet the description of a medium command, and 
10% meet the description of a large command. So even though the large command models 
have the biggest price differences between the vendors, when they are weighted 
appropriately, the cost savings are not as much as they would appear to be when 
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unweighted, since such a small percentage of commands meet the criteria for a large 
command as given in Section A of this chapter. Figure 21 highlights the weighted averages 
for each vendor—both in individual cost components, where they charge for services, and 
in total international services and overall services, including domestic charges. 
 
  Weighted Average 
Data Costs (Verizon) $6,336.00 
Data Costs (AT&T) $6,336.00 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $768.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $1,017.60 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $7,680.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $960.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $768.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Verizon) $456.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (AT&T) $456.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Verizon) $45.60 
Incoming Texts $ (AT&T) $1,860.00 
International Subtotal (T-Mobile) $814.08 
Domestic Subtotal (T-Mobile) $35,511.71 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $36,325.79 
International Subtotal (Verizon) $7,014.56 
Domestic Subtotal (Verizon) $43,864.00 
Grand Total (Verizon) $50,878.56 
International  Subtotal (AT&T) $15,286.56 
Domestic Subtotal (AT&T) $44,496.17 
Grand Total (AT&T) $59,782.73 
International Subtotal (Sprint) $1,017.60 
Domestic Subtotal (Sprint) $25,177.21 
Grand Total (Sprint) $26,194.81 
International Subtotal (Google) $798.72 
Domestic Subtotal (Google) $33,512.46 
Grand Total (Google) $34,311.18 
Figure 21. Modeling Analysis Weighted Averages 
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The main takeaway here is that the two vendors with the most task orders assigned 
to them, Verizon and AT&T, have the highest costs associated with their plans when 
international services are used. Figures 22 and 23 highlight the cost savings per account 
for both Verizon and AT&T if these accounts with international charges switched to one 
of the other three other vendors. 
 
Figure 22. International Cost Comparison for Verizon 
 
Figure 23. International Cost Comparison for AT&T 
In our modeling analysis, if all accounts under Verizon switched to Google, 
Verizon, or Sprint, they would save approximately $6,000 per account. With AT&T, this 
would be more than twice that, with cost savings of over $14,000 per account if they 
switched to a service provider with more competitive rates, such as Google, T-Mobile, or 
Sprint.  
A few caveats need to be made here. First, given that we did not actually obtain 
granular data, these are not actual cost savings but hypothetical cost savings derived from 
the assumptions made in our modeling. The variance in reality is always going to be 
different than the steady state that we take as given when the modeling assumptions are 
Savings Verizon to Google Per Account $6,215.84
Savings Verizon to T-Mobile Per Account $6,200.48
Savings Verizon to Sprint Per Account $5,996.96
Number of Verizon Accounts w/ Int. 164                    
Total Savings Verizon to Google $1,019,397.76
Total Savings Verizon to T-Mobile 1,016,878.72$ 
Total Savings Verizon to Sprint 983,501.44$    
Savings AT&T to Google Per Account $14,487.84
Savings AT&T to T-Mobile Per Account $14,472.48
Savings AT&T to Sprint Per Account $14,268.96
Number of AT&T Accounts w/Int. 285                    
Total Savings AT&T to Google 4,129,034.40$ 
Total Savings AT&T to T-Mobile 4,124,656.80$ 
Total Savings AT&T to Sprint 4,066,653.60$ 
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presented. What this means is that the actual charges would vary by individual commands 
across months when they did not need to utilize international services as much. However, 
what our modeling analysis does show is that under the current pricing structure of the 
Spiral 3 contract, there likely are major cost differences that can drive prices up for those 
commands that utilize international services.  
Second, the AT&T prices were based on the NTE prices defined in the Spiral 3 
contract. It is quite likely that the prices AT&T charges are lower than these prices in some 
instances, although in the one instance of AT&T pricing that we have, international data, 
the price they charge matches the NTE rate in the Spiral 3 contract. As can be seen in 
Chapter IV, AT&T has eight accounts that reached international charges of over $100,000 
in our data period. AT&T is the vendor with the largest number of accounts that reached 
six figures; the next closest, Verizon, only had three. While it is impossible to determine 
what AT&T’s rates are—given their refusal to provide them to NAVSUP FLC SD as 
market research—it appears very likely based on actual prices that they currently charge 
the highest for international services between data, voice, and texting. 
Given that we had to use NTE rates for AT&T, this allowed for another observation 
on the current iteration of the Spiral 3 contract. Essentially, the AT&T rates in this 
modeling analysis are equal to the highest rates that a company could charge under the 
Spiral 3 contract. As mentioned in Figure 23, the cost savings that would be gained by 
moving to one of the more competitive accounts such as T-Mobile are over $14,000 per 
account. Even under the constraint of an artificial price ceiling imposed by the government 
onto commercial vendors, there is a great amount of price volatility under this ceiling that 
can have very costly ramifications for those commands that have a lot of international 
usage. 
Given our analysis, it is easy to look at the cost breakdowns and determine the 
biggest cost driver for international services. First, for AT&T, their highest cost breakdown 
would be voice minutes, but these rates are also based on a flat rate of NTE $2/minute, 
which led to a weighted average of $7,680.00. While this seems high, it is in line with and 
slightly cheaper than their current commercial model, which charges $1/minute for Canada 
and Mexico, $2/minute for Europe, and $3/minute for everywhere else (AT&T, 2020). 
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Second, AT&T data charges were another big factor at $6,336.00. Given that each phone 
that uses international data charges accrues a $16 monthly access fee, the more phones that 
are used overseas at large commands, the more costs will rise for those commands. Indeed, 
this was also the main cost driver for Verizon. Since Verizon also charge $16 for unlimited 
service, their weighted average for international data was also $6,336.00. 
Since the above analysis was based on assumptions, in order to calculate total 
savings by switching from more expensive to less expensive vendors, assumptions on 
number of accounts had to be made. For Verizon, 165 accounts were used as a working 
assumption since, in our data period, this was the number of accounts that had international 
charges during that time. Likewise, for AT&T, 285 accounts were used as this was the 
number of accounts that had international charges for AT&T within our data period. For 
Verizon, granular total cost savings can be seen in Figure 22. On average, the government 
could save a total of $1,006,592.64 if all Verizon accounts with international plans 
switched from Verizon to either Sprint, Google Fi, or T-Mobile. For AT&T, granular total 
cost savings can be seen in Figure 23. On average, the government could save a total of 
$4,106,781.60 if all AT&T accounts with international plans switched from Verizon to 
either Sprint, Google Fi, or T-Mobile. These savings might seem large, and they are, but it 
must be remembered that these are based on hypothetical usage models tailored with actual 
rates, with the additional assumption of maximum usage of international services provided. 
In actuality, international rate usage—and what is charged against a command’s 
international plan on a monthly basis—will vary from our modeling assumption, which 
assumed a static and constant usage rate. Based on our analysis, there is a clear and 
substantial cost difference when choosing Verizon or AT&T over the other service 
providers, and there should be a compelling reason beyond brand preference to justify 
using them over their competitors.  
Based on our modeling analysis, the top vendors that had the most international 
charges, AT&T and Verizon, also had the highest total of international charges among their 
respective accounts. Conversely, T-Mobile, one of the cheapest options for international 
service in our modeling, had the lowest total of international charges, where the command 
with the international spend was around $20,000, which was approximately five to 10 times 
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less for the highest accounts at Verizon and AT&T, respectively. While not conclusive, our 
modeling does suggest at the very least that the reason T-Mobile international charges are 
so much cheaper in reality is not because of usage or lack thereof (i.e., the commands who 
had task orders with T-Mobile just did not use much international services), but because 
T-Mobile pricing structure—where only voice minutes were charged at a competitive 
rate—deflated all costs for international services for T-Mobile DON accounts in 
comparison to its competitors AT&T and Verizon. 
Interestingly, Google Fi, even at its commercial prices, was much more competitive 
than both AT&T and Verizon for international services and was in line with the 
government pricing provided by T-Mobile and Sprint. While the Spiral series of contracts 
have typically been the domain solely of the “Big Four” U.S. wireless companies, 
companies entering into the market as MVNOs are showing that there is much potential to 
use them as competitive resources on future iterations of the Spiral 3 contract. Even though 
there is one MVNO already on the contract, it is hard to say how much of a serious bidder 
they are because (a) we do not have any of their pricing, and (b) we do not know if they 
have even made any bids. If an MVNO such as Google Fi were added to a future Spiral 
contract and maintained a competitive presence, the potential for cost savings for the DON 
may be significant. 
In sum, what we could not do in this chapter, due to lack of data, was to identify 
actual cost savings, since the data we had was not the data we needed to parse this out. 
However, what we have shown in this chapter is that, based on the actual cost structures 
provided by the Spiral 3 vendors themselves and some reasonable assumptions about a 
command’s international wireless service requirements, commands have the opportunity 
to make significant cost savings by picking a different wireless vendor that has a more 
competitive pricing scheme for international services. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the beginning of Chapter I, the following primary research question was 
presented: 
1. How can the Navy better acquire international cellular and wireless 
services than it does currently? 
Secondary and related research questions that help answer our primary research question 
include 
2. What are the gaps in international service currently, and how can the Navy 
fill them?  
3. Why is it so costly for the Navy to acquire international cellular and 
wireless service? 
Based on the analysis and background provided in the preceding chapters, we can 
now answer these research questions. By answering the second and third questions first, 
we can then easily answer the primary research question. 
A. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE GAPS 
The main gaps in international service are a direct consequence of how international 
services are acquired in the Spiral 3 contract. Under the ELIN structure, all domestic 
wireless and cellular services have set prices that are negotiated and incorporated into the 
contract at the time of the contract’s award, and all future task orders must comply with 
the prices written into the contract; however, requirements for international services are 
not formulated with set prices. The impetus behind this was most likely due to the nature 
of international roaming agreements, whereby wireless vendors would come to agreements 
with overseas vendors on roaming prices so that their customers traveling overseas could 
utilize those foreign wireless networks when abroad. AT&T responded on this process in 
their market research to NAVSUP FLC SD as follows: 
AT&T’s international roaming rates are based upon a negotiation between 
the host nation Carriers and the Country of origin. Inbound and outbound 
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local calling ratios are analyzed by each carrier, and a surplus/deficit in 
usage may compel either carrier to raise or lower rates. The agreed upon 
rate is the basis for AT&T’s international roaming packages available to all 
customers at any given time. AT&T analyzes historical roaming and 
customer usage patterns to derive compelling international roaming 
packages. (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020) 
Likewise, Verizon responded similarly, illuminating the process as they stated the 
following to NAVSUP FLC SD: 
Verizon and other carriers negotiate commercial agreements with 
OCONUS (Outside the Continental United States) carriers to provide 
commercial wireless service outside the U.S. Verizon maintains hundreds 
of such agreements to make wireless service available to all customers 
including government, enterprise, and consumer in over 200+ countries 
worldwide. Pricing is negotiated with each individual OCONUS carrier. 
Details on these negotiations are proprietary and confidential. These 
commercial vendor agreements are negotiated on behalf of all of Verizon 
customers. They are not subcontracts entered to serve just the Federal 
Government or the Navy/USMC. As a result, the Federal Government 
benefits from these commercially negotiated rates as a component of the 
entire Verizon pricing platform. (T. Thompson, personal communication, 
2020) 
Some main points provided by both AT&T and Verizon here might go a long way 
toward showing why the current international structure under the Spiral 3 was originally 
implemented. First, U.S. wireless vendors maintain a plethora of international agreements 
with OCONUS wireless vendors to provide roaming services to their customers. 
Presumably, these agreements are based on local competition, capability of a provider’s 
range, and so on. Additionally, the rates in the agreement appear to constantly change based 
on usage. Given this, a U.S. wireless vendor would argue that these factors would then 
make it impossible for them to provide the government standardized international pricing. 
Due to the constantly changing landscape of international roaming agreements, companies 
could not forecast that far in advance on a multiple-year contract vehicle such as Spiral 3.  
There are two sides to this argument. The vendors could obviously say that they 
cannot offer a standardized price because if international roaming agreements increased, 
they might fail to make a profit and could potentially lose money if the rates they charge 
their Spiral 3 customers are less than what they would end up paying under an international 
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roaming agreement. Conversely, the vendors could argue that by allowing for a contract 
structure to match the unknown qualities that make up the landscape of international 
roaming agreements (i.e., having constant competition for international wireless services) 
this would allow wireless vendors to potentially be in a position to offer lower prices than 
if they had to standardize them over a multiple-year period, where these prices would most 
certainly be higher to cover against any potential increase in prices that they are charged in 
international roaming agreements. 
However, this idea that because the market for international roaming agreements is 
so volatile that prices cannot be predetermined in a multiyear contract is based on a flawed 
premise and uses the guise of proprietary data as justification for not being up front with 
their prices. In a report on international roaming agreements, the OECD discussed the trend 
of wholesale prices steadily decreasing between vendors while the retail prices to the 
customers remained stagnant, concluding that “experience has shown that large operators 
… do not seek to put rates into the retail market at levels that would be expected in a 
competitive market, even though balancing gives them the wherewithal to do so” (OECD, 
2013, p. 8). The veracity of this idea can be seen even within the Spiral 3 contract, where 
both Sprint and T-Mobile offer much more competitive international wireless services than 
either AT&T and Verizon, even though they operate within the same business 
environment. T-Mobile stated that they currently have over 700 international roaming 
agreements in place (T. Thompson, personal communication, August 10, 2020), yet this 
has not stopped them from being able to offer an extremely competitive model for wireless 
services, including free data and texts when ordering domestic lines and voice minutes that 
are only $0.20 globally, regardless of country. It is therefore abundantly clear that Verizon 
and AT&T believe that their lack of transparency on international rates favors them due to 
their dominance in the market and their brand popularity, which allows them to take 
advantage of the lower rates they are paying to exploit their customers. Our modeling has 
shown that they are not a strong competitor when it comes to choosing an international 
service provider.  
Even within the constraints of the Spiral 3 contract, the vendors themselves are 
willing to comply with standardized, long-term pricing. As mentioned in the previous 
68 
chapter, since Spiral 3 rates for AT&T could not be obtained, the NTE price ceilings for 
the Spiral 3 contract had to be used in lieu of that, which included $2 per voice minute in 
any country, $0.50 per incoming and outgoing text, and a $16 per month flat fee per phone 
for unlimited international data. If a wireless vendor did not have some idea of what their 
costs would be for international services, even these price ceilings would not be amenable 
to them from a business standpoint. 
The main gap in how international services are procured currently becomes more 
pronounced based on the NTE price ceilings as the Spiral 3 contract essentially allows the 
vendors to set the pricing on a case-by-case basis on any given task order rather than 
working to negotiate with the vendors before the Spiral 3 contracts were even awarded to 
lock in pricing throughout the contract. Additionally, there are very minimal controls on 
international service procurement other than price ceilings, but as can be seen in the 
previous chapter, these NTE price ceilings can lead to significantly higher costs than usage 
with vendors that had substantially more competitive rates. A lot of negotiation and 
analysis went into the domestic portion of the Spiral 3 contract, which undoubtedly makes 
up the bulk of the services procured, but it is worth highlighting the main aspects of this 
part of the contract to see how NAVSUP FLC SD was able to maximize cost savings: 
• Offering only those wireless plans that aligned with DON usage, 
• Delivering competitively priced wireless packages (inclusive of 
devices, unlimited texting, Push to Talk [PTT], and other features 
used by the DON), 
• Standardizing rate plans among all wireless providers to maximize 
competition and obtain even lower pricing, 
• Capitalizing on changes in the marketplace, 
• Incorporating improved industry standards and technological advances 
(technology leveling), 
• Providing the DON real‐time (as invoiced) visibility of its wireless usage, 
and  
• Aggregating and optimizing rate plans by sharing and pooling. (Thompson, 
2015, p. 3) 
All of these processes that were used to cut down on prices on the domestic portion 
of the Spiral 3 contract are noticeably absent on the international portion of the contract. 
Just based on the analysis within this thesis itself, many of these initiatives would seem to 
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be very promising in lowering pricing on international services rather than the current 
laissez-faire model that allows the wireless vendors a lot of latitude when providing pricing 
on Spiral 3 task orders. This gap in the international service procurement portion of the 
Spiral 3 contract leads into the other secondary research question of this thesis: Why is 
procuring international services so costly? 
B. HIGH COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL WIRELESS SERVICES 
The fundamental reason that international wireless services are so costly has to do 
with the fact that the U.S. cellular industry is not purely competitive. The U.S. wireless 
industry is split among, up until recently, four vendors, T-Mobile, Sprint, AT&T, and 
Verizon, which made up 98% of the market share in the United States for wireless and 
cellular services (Wallis, 2019). With the recent T-Mobile/Sprint merger, this means that 
98% of the market share is now controlled by three vendors. This classifies the market as 
an oligopoly, where a small number of sellers have a lot of purchasing power due to their 
large share of the market. In an environment such as this, the sellers typically act as price 
setters rather than price takers, as there is not much competition that could drastically stop 
one of these sellers from acting in such a manner. This does not mean that the threat of 
competition will not have any effect on a competitor’s pricing. For example, in 2017, 
Verizon abruptly brought back its unlimited domestic plans, which promptly led AT&T, 
T-Mobile, and Sprint to quickly follow suit and offer unlimited plans of their own 
(Gartenberg, 2017). However, given the amount of infrastructure that is owned by the 
various U.S. wireless companies to provide services to consumers, the barriers for entry 
are not just high for new entrants, they can also give these specific companies an advantage 
since they already have infrastructure in place when their competitors do not. For example, 
let’s say that in one city only Verizon has a cellular tower that provides coverage. Even if 
a competitor can offer lower prices to a consumer in that area, it will not do much good if 
their lower prices also provide lesser coverage. From an economics standpoint, the 
actualities of physical infrastructure cause the U.S. telecommunication industry to be more 
inelastic than it would be otherwise if all companies could provide equal service coverage 
to all consumers equally. This allows cellular companies to keep their prices higher given 
that (a) for some consumers, a cellular company might be their only option in a specific 
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area, and (b) each company has such a giant share of the market that losing a few customers 
to a competitor will not have much effect on their bottom line. 
Yet, the DON has one advantage that the average consumer does not, and that is its 
own purchasing power. The Spiral 3 contract, including its base value and four option 
years, has a potential value of $993.5 million (Lieberman, 2019). This is a significant 
amount of business to any company, whether they be in a monopoly, an oligopoly, or an 
environment of pure competition. Notably, this purchasing power is the underlying reason 
that the Navy was able to compel the Spiral 3 vendors into providing such competitive 
government rates when compared to the commercial market. Given that the vendors with 
the most task orders under the Spiral 3 account, Verizon and AT&T, also have the costliest 
international service plans, it is clear that the DON has not yet utilized their purchasing 
power to achieve the same levels of cost savings on international services that they have 
on domestic plans.  
The answer to why international services are so costly then becomes twofold. First, 
the major vendors of the cellular industry that all compete for task orders under the Spiral 
3 contract operate in an environment of oligopoly. Consequently, the traditional benefits 
of competition for the buyer to help lower prices among qualified vendors do not work to 
the extent that would be seen in an environment of pure competition. This allows AT&T 
and Verizon to offer less competitive prices under the Spiral 3 contract than its other 
competitors, Sprint and T-Mobile.6 Second, NAVSUP FLC SD has not utilized the 
purchasing power of the DON to its full advantage in the way that it did when it was 
negotiating prices for domestic services. The rationale behind this might be due to what 
was mentioned in the previous section, that the complexity of vendors using international 
roaming agreements to offer roaming services to its consumers has enabled this idea of 
constant competition for international services at the time of pre-award on a task order as 
opposed to being codified within the contract. However, NAVSUP FLC SD could look to 
the service plans of Sprint or T-Mobile, or vendors not under the plan, like Google Fi, to 
                                                 
6 What is unknown is if the vendors under the Spiral 3 contract know each other’s international service 
plans that are offered under the Spiral 3 contract. If they are known, the cheaper plans available under the 
Spiral 3 contract have not compelled prices to go down on those plans that are more expensive. 
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see that even though the prices that vendors negotiate for international roaming services 
might fluctuate, this does not mean that the vendors cannot forecast relatively accurate 
estimates that both enable the vendor to continue to make a profit and ensure that the 
government pays a fair and reasonable price for these services. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCESS CHANGES AND FUTURE 
STUDY  
Based on the findings of our research, we identified several recommendations and 
opportunities for process changes to the business and contracting practices for DOD 
wireless solutions and future studies for stakeholders to consider.  
1. Recommendation #1: Standardize International Rates in Contract 
One of the problems that we recognized during our background review of the 
existing contracts under the Spiral 3 MAC and data collection for our research was the lack 
of clarity on pricing for international service ELINs. The prices listed in the contracts were 
“TBD based on competition” (SAM, 2017c). This essentially turned over all cost control 
for international service to the service providers and has contributed to the government’s 
lack of insight into the disproportionally large costs the government is paying for these 
services as identified in our data and analysis chapters.  
In doing our market research for these chapters to better understand the rates that 
actually go into what the government is spending on international services, it became clear 
that these prices need to be requested up front in the next iteration of the Spiral contract. 
The service providers, for the most part, were reluctant to share how they develop their 
pricing schemes for international services, citing their being proprietary in nature due to 
their use agreements with their global partners, but they did share their international rates 
without specifics on how the government has been charged.  
Therefore, we recommend that in the solicitation for the next Spiral contract that 
all service providers provide the specifics on international service fees and rate structures 
to better inform the government’s decision on which providers to include in the MAC and 
which providers offer the best and most competitive pricing for the commands that require 
international services. By holding them to agree upon pricing structure up front, the 
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government will at least know the charges to expect and will be able to avoid the regular 
instances of anti-deficiency from the commands that require international services.  
Additionally, we recommend that the data on international usage be included as a 
reporting requirement from the service providers. This data was one of the largest 
roadblocks we came across in attempting to do our analysis. By having the international 
usage data available, the government can be better informed on actual usage and can 
develop better requirements definitions in future follow-on contracts. While the data will 
surely come at a cost to the government, we believe it will be essential to improving 
competition and driving prices down in the long run.  
2. Recommendation #2: Increase Competition 
Throughout the course of our research, we determined that increased competition 
in the Spiral 3 MAC has decreased prices across the board except when it comes to the cost 
of international services. We noted that this is due to the nature of the wireless industry in 
the United States. The U.S. wireless industry is split among, up until recently, four vendors, 
T-Mobile, Sprint, AT&T, and Verizon, which made up 98% of the market share in the 
United States for wireless and cellular services (Wallis, 2019), and with the recent T-
Mobile/Sprint merger, this means that 98% of the market share is now controlled by only 
three vendors, operating in an oligopoly. From our analysis, there was clear cost savings to 
be had from T-Mobile and Sprint in their generous pricing for international services. Only 
time will tell if they will maintain these competitive pricing schemes as a singular 
company, being closer in size to Verizon and AT&T, or if they will increase their pricing 
to be more in line with their larger competitors as they approach equality in the market 
place through their merger. 
We recommend bringing in smaller, boutique-type service providers for the next 
version of the Spiral contract. In our research, we discussed the potential benefits that 
MVNO providers may offer. In our analysis, we included one of the more popular MVNO 
providers, Google Fi, as commercially they have proven to be a strong provider, especially 
for international service requirements. Additionally, Google has made it clear that they are 
interested in expanding the business that they do with the government through cloud 
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computing and artificial intelligence programs (Tucker, 2019), so it would be safe to 
assume that they would be interested in being included in the next version of the Spiral 
contract. Our analysis showed that they would be a strong competitor based solely on their 
commercial prices, so bringing them in as a competitor against traditional MNO providers 
has the potential for further cost savings to the government and is likely to improve 
Google’s place as a competitor in the U.S. wireless industry.  
3. Recommendation #3: Better Define End User Requirements 
From our research and analysis, it became clear that the end users do not adequately 
define their requirements, particularly when it comes to international service requirements. 
This has the secondary effect of framing the quotes the service providers submit under 
Spiral 3 when a new task order is competed. If the requirements submitted by commands 
requesting new service were more accurate and in line with what is seen through the usage, 
we would expect that T-Mobile and Sprint would be winning a more significant number of 
awards, especially from those commands that require any marginal amount of international 
services, due to their significantly lower costs.  
A better end user requirements definition will not only result in more savings but 
will also result in more commands not becoming anti-deficient when they exceed their 
service agreements. This will also relieve the administrative burden of the contracting 
office and the service providers in doing frequent and unnecessary modifications to the 
task orders. Additionally, a better requirements definition will assist NAVSUP in creating 
requests for proposal for the next version of the Spiral MAC through accurate and detailed 
requirements. This further supports our first recommendation to standardize rates for 
international services. It will also better inform how NAVSUP defines its business rules 
for commands when submitting requests for new task orders under the Spiral 3 contract. 
Based on our analysis, we recommend that NAVSUP create business rules for commands 
that have any moderate level of international service requirements, stating that the 
commands must request service from the preferred service provider T-Mobile/Sprint due 
to the significant cost savings potential.  
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4. Recommendations for Future Study 
In the process of conducting our research, and due to extenuating circumstances 
involved in obtaining data during the COVID-19 pandemic, we have identified a few areas 
that we recommend for future studies and research that may have the potential to identify 
further savings for the DOD through the way the government acquires wireless services.  
The first recommendation we have for future study would be to conduct a business 
case analysis based on actual command usage for international services. As previously 
discussed in our data and analysis chapters, we were unable to get the granular data we had 
originally hoped to obtain. Therefore, we had to build a model based on some reasonable 
assumptions about phone usage. By using actual usage data, a future study may be able to 
calculate cost-saving potential with more confidence than our model does. 
Another area that we recommend for future studies would be to do an analysis of 
global rates for international services. This should be done by obtaining the cost of data, 
text messaging, and voice minutes in areas where the DOD currently uses international 
services and compare those prices to what our current service providers charge to determine 
if there are actual cost savings obtained by using them for international service or if there 
are other avenues available for further saving potential. Our attempts to obtain this data 
ended early on due to extremely high costs to access the readily available databases where 
this information is available through GSMA. There is potential to partner on further 
research with organizations who already have access to GSMA data or to access the data 
through sponsors who have the funding available to access to the GSMA database.  
That research may help inform a larger study into a cost–benefit analysis of the 
DOD establishing its own MVNO and forgoing contracts with commercial service 
providers to internalize the cost and ability to provide wireless services through their 
existing communication infrastructure. We envision such a study involving market 
research that explores potential MVNEs’ ability to maintain a DOD mobile network, 
examines costs to obtain the devices currently included in the Spiral 3 contract through 
service providers, and analyzes existing communication infrastructure capability to support 
a DOD MVNO. This can be used as a basis to conduct a business case analysis on the 
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establishment of a program office for a DOD mobile network to determine if the 
government is truly better off acquiring mobile services commercially or if an MVNO 
would be more cost effective. 
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APPENDIX A. RAW TOTAL RESULTING FROM MODELING 
  Small Company 1 Small Company 2 Small Company 3 
Number of Phones 10 10 10 
Phones with International Data 3 5 7 
Data Costs (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Verizon) $576.00 $960.00 $1,344.00 
Data Costs (AT&T) $576.00 $960.00 $1,344.00 
Data Costs (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled Minutes 100 200 300 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $240.00 $480.00 $720.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $288.00 $576.00 $1,344.00 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $2,400.00 $4,800.00 $7,200.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $300.00 $600.00 $900.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $240.00 $480.00 $720.00 
Pooled Out. Texts 10 20 30 
Outgoing Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Verizon) $60.00 $120.00 $180.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (AT&T) $60.00 $120.00 $180.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled In. Texts 10 20 30 
Incoming Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Verizon) $6.00 $12.00 $18.00 
Incoming Texts $ (AT&T) $60.00 $120.00 $7,200.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
International Subtotal (T-Mobile) $254.40 $508.80 $763.20 
Domestic Subtotal (T-Mobile) $5,380.56 $5,380.56 $5,380.56 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $5,634.96 $5,889.36 $6,143.76 
International Subtotal (Verizon) $964.56 $1,725.60 $2,486.64 
Domestic Subtotal (Verizon) $7,632.00 $7,632.00 $7,632.00 
Grand Total (Verizon) $8,596.56 $9,357.60 $10,118.64 
International Subtotal (AT&T) $3,130.56 $6,057.60 $8,876.64 
Domestic Subtotal (AT&T) $6,740.33 $6,740.33 $6,740.33 
Grand Total (AT&T) $9,870.89 $12,797.93 $15,616.97 
International Subtotal (Sprint) $318.00 $636.00 $954.00 
Domestic  Subtotal (Sprint) $3,814.73 $3,814.73 $3,814.73 
Grand Total (Sprint) $4,132.73 $4,450.73 $4,768.73 
International Subtotal (Google) $254.40 $508.80 $720.00 
Domestic  Subtotal (Google) $5,724.00 $5,724.00 $5,767.20 




  Medium Company 1 Medium Company 2 Medium Company 3 
Number of Phones 100 100 100 
Phones with Int. Data 30 50 70 
Data Costs (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Verizon) $5,760.00 $9,600.00 $13,440.00 
Data Costs (AT&T) $5,760.00 $9,600.00 $13,440.00 
Data Costs (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled Minutes 200 400 600 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $480.00 $960.00 $1,440.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $576.00 $1,152.00 $1,728.00 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $4,800.00 $9,600.00 $14,400.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $600.00 $1,200.00 $1,800.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $480.00 $960.00 $1,440.00 
Pooled Out. Texts 40 80 120 
Outgoing Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing  Texts $ (Verizon) $240.00 $480.00 $720.00 
Outgoing  Texts $ (AT&T) $240.00 $480.00 $720.00 
Outgoing  Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled In. Texts 40 80 120 
Incoming Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming  Texts $ (Verizon) $24.00 $48.00 $72.00 
Incoming  Texts $ (AT&T) $240.00 $480.00 $720.00 
Incoming  Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming  Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
International Subtotal (T-
Mobile) 
$508.80 $1,017.60 $1,526.40 
Domestic Subtotal (T-Mobile) $53,805.60 $53,805.70 $53,805.60 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $54,314.40 $54,823.30 $55,332.00 
International Subtotal (Verizon) $6,945.60 $11,856.00 $16,766.40 
Domestic Subtotal (Verizon) $76,320.00 $76,320.00 $76,320.00 
Grand Total (Verizon) $83,265.60 $88,176.00 $93,086.40 
International  Subtotal (AT&T) $11,385.60 $20,736.00 $30,086.40 
Domestic Subtotal (AT&T) $67,503.28 $67,403.28 $67,403.28 
Grand Total (AT&T) $78,888.88 $88,139.28 $97,489.68 
International  Subtotal (Sprint) $636.00 $1,272.00 $1,908.00 
Domestic Subtotal (Sprint) $38,147.28 $38,147.28 $38,147.28 
Grand Total (Sprint) $38,783.28 $39,419.28 $40,055.28 
International Subtotal (Google) $480.00 $1,017.60 $1,526.40 
Domestic Subtotal (Google) $28.80 $57,240.00 $67,035.41 




  Large Company 1 Large Company 2 Large Company 3 
Number of Phones 300 300 300 
Phones with International Data 90 150 210 
Data Costs (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Verizon) $17,280.00 $28,800.00 $40,320.00 
Data Costs (AT&T) $17,280.00 $28,800.00 $40,320.00 
Data Costs (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Data Costs (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled Minutes 400 800 1200 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $960.00 $1,920.00 $2,880.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $1,152.00 $2,304.00 $3,456.00 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $9,600.00 $19,200.00 $28,800.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $1,200.00 $2,400.00 $3,600.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $960.00 $1,920.00 $2,880.00 
Pooled Out. Texts 200 400 600 
Outgoing Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Verizon) $1,200.00 $2,400.00 $3,600.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (AT&T) $1,200.00 $2,400.00 $3,600.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Pooled In. Texts 200 400 600 
Incoming Texts $ (T-Mobile) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Verizon) $120.00 $240.00 $360.00 
Incoming Texts $ (AT&T) $1,200.00 $2,400.00 $3,600.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Sprint) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Incoming Texts $ (Google) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
International Subtotal (T-
Mobile) 
$1,017.60 $2,035.20 $3,052.80 
Domestic Subtotal (T-Mobile) $161,416.80 $161,416.80 $161,416.80 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $162,434.40 $163,452.00 $164,469.60 
International  Subtotal (Verizon) $20,788.80 $1,728.00 $50,155.20 
Domestic Subtotal (Verizon) $228,960.00 $33,744.00 $228,960.00 
Grand Total (Verizon) $249,748.80 $35,472.00 $279,115.20 
International  Subtotal (AT&T) $30,316.80 $54,528.00 $78,739.20 
Domestic Subtotal (AT&T) $202,209.84 $202,209.84 $202,209.84 
Grand Total (AT&T) $232,526.64 $256,737.84 $280,949.04 
International  Subtotal (Sprint) $1,272.00 $2,544.00 $3,816.00 
Domestic Subtotal (Sprint) $114,441.84 $114,441.84 $114,441.84 
Grand Total (Sprint) $115,713.84 $116,985.84 $118,257.84 
 International Subtotal (Google) $1,017.60 $1,920.00 $3,052.80 
Domestic Subtotal (Google) $185,614.66 $171,835.20 $171,720.00 
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APPENDIX B. WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF TOTAL 
INTERNATIONAL ROAMING COSTS ACROSS MODELS 
 
 Small Company 1 Medium Company 1 Large Company 1 
Weighted 
Company 1 
Data Costs (Verizon) $345.60 $1,728.00 $1,728.00 $3,801.60 
Data Costs (AT&T) $345.60 $1,728.00 $1,728.00 $3,801.60 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $144.00 $144.00 $96.00 $384.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $172.80 $172.80 $115.20 $460.80 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $1,440.00 $1,440.00 $960.00 $3,840.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $180.00 $180.00 $120.00 $480.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $144.00 $144.00 $96.00 $384.00 
Outgoing Texts $ 
(Verizon) $36.00 $72.00 $120.00 $228.00 
Outgoing Texts $ 
(AT&T) $36.00 $72.00 $120.00 $228.00 
Incoming Texts $ 
(Verizon) $3.60 $7.20 $12.00 $22.80 
Incoming Texts $ 
(AT&T) $36.00 $72.00 $120.00 $228.00 
International Subtotal 
(T-Mobile) $152.64 $152.64 $101.76 $407.04 
Domestic Subtotal (T-
Mobile) $3,228.34 $16,141.68 $16,141.68 $35,511.70 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $3,380.98 $16,294.32 $16,243.44 $35,918.74 
International Subtotal 
(Verizon) $578.74 $2,083.68 $2,078.88 $4,741.30 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Verizon) $4,579.20 $22,896.00 $22,896.00 $50,371.20 
Grand Total (Verizon) $5,157.94 $24,979.68 $24,974.88 $55,112.50 
 International Subtotal 
(AT&T) $1,878.34 $3,415.68 $3,031.68 $8,325.70 
Domestic Subtotal 
(AT&T) $4,044.20 $20,250.98 $20,220.98 $44,516.17 
Grand Total (AT&T) $5,922.53 $23,666.66 $23,252.66 $52,841.86 
 International Subtotal 
(Sprint) $190.80 $190.80 $127.20 $508.80 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Sprint) $2,288.84 $11,444.18 $11,444.18 $25,177.21 
Grand Total (Sprint) $2,479.64 $11,634.98 $11,571.38 $25,686.01 
International  Subtotal 
(Google) $152.64 $144.00 $101.76 $398.40 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Google) $3,434.40 $8.64 $18,561.47 $22,004.51 
Grand Total (Google) $3,587.04 $152.64 $18,663.23 $22,402.91 
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 Small Company 2 Medium Company 2 Large Company 2 
Weighted 
Company 2 
Data Costs (Verizon) $576.00 $2,880.00 $2,880.00 $6,336.00 
Data Costs (AT&T) $576.00 $2,880.00 $2,880.00 $6,336.00 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $288.00 $288.00 $192.00 $768.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $345.60 $345.60 $230.40 $921.60 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $2,880.00 $2,880.00 $1,920.00 $7,680.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $360.00 $360.00 $240.00 $960.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $288.00 $288.00 $192.00 $768.00 
Outgoing Texts $ 
(Verizon) $72.00 $144.00 $240.00 $456.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (AT&T) $72.00 $144.00 $240.00 $456.00 
Incoming Texts $ 
(Verizon) $7.20 $14.40 $24.00 $45.60 
Incoming Texts $ (AT&T) $72.00 $144.00 $240.00 $456.00 
International Subtotal 
(T-Mobile) $305.28 $305.28 $203.52 $814.08 
Domestic Subtotal (T-
Mobile) $3,228.34 $16,141.71 $16,141.68 $35,511.73 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $3,533.62 $16,446.99 $16,345.20 $36,325.81 
International Subtotal 
(Verizon) $1,035.36 $3,556.80 $172.80 $4,764.96 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Verizon) $4,579.20 $22,896.00 $3,374.40 $30,849.60 
Grand Total (Verizon) $5,614.56 $26,452.80 $3,547.20 $35,614.56 
 International Subtotal 
(AT&T) $3,634.56 $6,220.80 $5,452.80 $15,308.16 
Domestic Subtotal 
(AT&T) $4,044.20 $20,220.98 $20,220.98 $44,486.17 
Grand Total (AT&T) $7,678.76 $26,441.78 $25,673.78 $59,794.33 
 International Subtotal 
(Sprint) $381.60 $381.60 $254.40 $1,017.60 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Sprint) $2,288.84 $11,444.18 $11,444.18 $25,177.21 
Grand Total (Sprint) $2,670.44 $11,825.78 $11,698.58 $26,194.81 
International  Subtotal 
(Google) $305.28 $305.28 $192.00 $802.56 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Google) $3,434.40 $17,172.00 $17,183.52 $37,789.92 
Grand Total (Google) $3,739.68 $17,477.28 $17,375.52 $38,592.48 
     
 Small Company 3 Medium Company 3 Large Company 3 
Weighted 
Company 3 
Data Costs (Verizon) $806.40 $4,032.00 $4,032.00 $8,870.40 
Data Costs (AT&T) $806.40 $4,032.00 $4,032.00 $8,870.40 
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $432.00 $432.00 $288.00 $1,152.00 
Minutes $ (Verizon) $806.40 $518.40 $345.60 $1,670.40 
Minutes $ (AT&T) $4,320.00 $4,320.00 $2,880.00 $11,520.00 
Minutes $ (Sprint) $540.00 $540.00 $360.00 $1,440.00 
Minutes $ (Google) $432.00 $432.00 $288.00 $1,152.00 
Outgoing Texts $ 
(Verizon) $108.00 $216.00 $360.00 $684.00 
Outgoing Texts $ (AT&T) $108.00 $216.00 $360.00 $684.00 
Incoming Texts $ 
(Verizon) $10.80 $21.60 $36.00 $68.40 
Incoming Texts $ (AT&T) $4,320.00 $216.00 $360.00 $4,896.00 
International Subtotal 
(T-Mobile) $457.92 $457.92 $305.28 $1,221.12 
Domestic Subtotal (T-
Mobile) $3,228.34 $16,141.68 $16,141.68 $35,511.70 
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $3,686.26 $16,599.60 $16,446.96 $36,732.82 
International Subtotal 
(Verizon) $1,491.98 $5,029.92 $5,015.52 $11,537.42 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Verizon) $4,579.20 $22,896.00 $22,896.00 $50,371.20 
Grand Total (Verizon) $6,071.18 $27,925.92 $27,911.52 $61,908.62 
83 
 International Subtotal 
(AT&T) $5,325.98 $9,025.92 $7,873.92 $22,225.82 
Domestic Subtotal 
(AT&T) $4,044.20 $20,220.98 $20,220.98 $44,486.17 
Grand Total (AT&T) $9,370.18 $29,246.90 $28,094.90 $66,711.99 
 International Subtotal 
(Sprint) $572.40 $572.40 $381.60 $1,526.40 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Sprint) $2,288.84 $11,444.18 $11,444.18 $25,177.21 
Grand Total (Sprint) $2,861.24 $12,016.58 $11,825.78 $26,703.61 
International  Subtotal 
(Google) $432.00 $457.92 $305.28 $1,195.20 
Domestic Subtotal 
(Google) $3,460.32 $20,110.62 $17,172.00 $40,742.94 
Grand Total (Google) $3,892.32 $20,568.54 $17,477.28 $41,938.14 
 
 Weighted Average 
 
  
Data Costs (Verizon) $6,336.00  
Data Costs (AT&T) $6,336.00  
Minutes $ (T-Mobile) $768.00  
Minutes $ (Verizon) $1,017.60  
Minutes $ (AT&T) $7,680.00  
Minutes $ (Sprint) $960.00  
Minutes $ (Google) $768.00  
Out. Texts $ (Verizon) $456.00  
Out. Texts $ (AT&T) $456.00  
In. Texts $ (Verizon) $45.60  
In. Texts $ (AT&T) $1,860.00  
Int. Subtotal (T-Mobile) $814.08  
Dom. Subtotal (T-Mobile) $35,511.71  
Grand Total (T-Mobile) $36,325.79  
Int. Subtotal (Verizon) $7,014.56  
Dom. Subtotal (Verizon) $43,864.00  
Grand Total (Verizon) $50,878.56  
Int. Subtotal (AT&T) $15,286.56  
Dom. Subtotal (AT&T) $44,496.17  
Grand Total (AT&T) $59,782.73  
Int. Subtotal (Sprint) $1,017.60  
Dom. Subtotal (Sprint) $25,177.21  
Grand Total (Sprint) $26,194.81  
Int. Subtotal (Google) $798.72  
Dom. Subtotal (Google) $33,512.46  




60% Commands = Small
30% Commands = Medium
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